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ABSTRACT 
ACUTE STRESS EXPOSURE AND EXPRESSION OF INSTRUMENTALLY 
CONDITIONED FINANCIAL PREFERENCES: 
AN FMRI STUDY 
 
 
William T. McCuddy, B.A. 
 
Marquette University, 2016 
 
 
Recent research suggests acute stress exposure is associated with increased habit-
based over goal-oriented decision making (e.g., Schwabe & Wolf, 2011). The current 
study examined whether acute stress promotes the expression of simple financial 
preferences “overtrained” to the point of habit in the face of a changing environment 
where said preferences were later rendered non-optimal.  
 
Over three days participants (N = 28) learned to discriminate between visual 
stimuli probabilistically associated with monetary gains or losses and made decisions 
between stimuli with real financial outcomes. On the fourth day after exposure to either 
an acute stressor or control procedure participants performed the same tasks during fMRI 
scanning, including a related task in which monetary values associated with the same 
stimuli were altered. Choice and fMRI data, psychophysiological measures and salivary 
cortisol were collected. Participants in both groups successfully made optimal decisions 
between stimuli on Days 1 to 3 (reaching asymptote on Day 2).  
 
During fMRI scanning after stimuli values were altered stressed participants made 
significantly more decisions consistent with original stimuli values, although these 
decisions were now financially detrimental, than did non-stressed participants. Thus, 
stressed participants made decisions more consistent with their overtrained (i.e., habit-
based) preferences. In the control group, differential levels of BOLD activation, relative 
to stimulus valence, were observed in regions associated with goal-directed (i.e., caudate 
and prefrontal cortex) and habit-based (i.e., putamen) behaviors during both overtrained 
and novel stimulus-outcome pairings. In the acute stress group, similar differential BOLD 
activation was limited to the putamen and was only observed for overtrained pairings. 
During the decision-making portion of the task, increased BOLD activation was observed 
in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and insula for incorrect relative to correct responses 
in both groups. Further, alterations in dorsolateral prefrontal and entorhinal cortex 
suggest some stress-related impairment of executive control of memory. 
 
The current study adds to research that demonstrates a dual-process of decision-
making and the propensity to resort to habitual behavior after exposure to acute stress. 
Further, these findings suggest stress-induced neural changes take place during both the 
learning and recall of reward-related information used in decision-making.
	 i	
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
William T. McCuddy, B.A. 
 
 
 First, I want to thank my Mother. Without her unwavering support, tenacious 
spirit, and constant love, this work would not be possible. I would also like to thank the 
entirety of my family, my cohort, and all my professors, my committee, and my director. 
Finally, I would like to thank the Graduate School and all of the Marquette University 
administration.  
 
  
	 ii	
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………………...v 
LIST OF FIGURES………………………………………………………………vi 
CHAPTER 
I. INTRODUCTION………………..……………………………….1 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW….………………..…………………….3 
A. Dual-Process Theories of Decision-Making…………………..3 
B. Goal Devaluation Studies: Measuring the Shift  
between Systems …………………………..……………….....6 
 
C. Major Stress Pathways….………………..………………........8 
D. Acute Laboratory Stress Techniques ….…………………….10 
E. The Brain’s Reward Processing Circuitry…………………...13 
i. Prefrontal Cortex….………………..………………...14 
ii. Striatum………………..………………..……………17 
iii. Other Reward Related Regions………………..……..18 
F. Learning and Decision-Making in the PFC and Striatum……19 
III. METHOD………………..………………..………………..……24 
A. Overview………………..………………..…………………..24 
B. Participants………………..………………………………….25 
C. Sample Size Justification………………..…………………...27 
D. Procedures………………..………………..…………………27 
i. Informed Consent………………..…………………...27 
ii. Cognitive Test Battery and Other Measures (Day 1)...28 
 
	 iii	
iii. Instrumental Conditioning Task Procedures 
Days 1 – 3……………………………………………30 
 
iv. Day 4 (Scan Day)………………..…………………...32 
E. Physiological Measures………………..…………………….33 
F. Stress Induction………………..………………..……………34 
IV. DATA ANALYSIS………………..……………………………..34 
A. Psychophysiological Data……………………………………34 
i. Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenal Axis (HPA) 
Measures……………………………………………..34 
 
ii. Sympathetic-Adrenal Medullary (SAM) Axis 
Measures……………………………………………..35 
 
B. Behavioral Data……………………………………………...35 
C. Neuropsychological Measures……………………………….36 
D. fMRI Analysis………………………………………………..36 
V. RESULTS………………………………………………………..38 
A. Subjective Ratings of Stress………………………………….38 
B. Psychophysiological Measures………………………………39 
i.  Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenal Axis (HPA) 
Measures……………………………………………..39 
 
ii. Sympathetic-Adrenal Medullary (SAM) Axis 
Measures……………………………………………..41 
 
iii. Behavioral Data...........................................................43 
iv. Days 1-3 Reaction Time (Learning Trials)…………..43 
v. Days 1-3 Decision Quality (Decision Trials)…..…….43 
vi. Scan Day Reaction Time (Learning Trials)………….44   
vii. Scan Day Decision Quality (Decision Trials)………..44 
	 iv	
C. fMRI Results…………………………………………………46 
i. Stimuli Valance (Learning): Positive EV – Negative 
EV Contrast………………………………………..…46 
 
ii. Stimuli Valance (Learning): Positive EV – Negative 
EV by Experimental Group Contrast……………...…48 
 
iii. Stimuli Valance (Learning): Positive EV – Negative 
EV by Experimental Group Contrast                         
(Pre-Reversal Only).…………………………………50 
 
iv. Stimuli Valance (Learning): Positive EV – Negative 
EV by Experimental Group Contrast                      
(Post-Reversal Only)…………………………………52 
 
v. Decision Quality (Decision): Composite Good      
Choice  – Bad Choice………………………………..54 
 
vi. Decision Quality (Decision): Composite Good     
Choice  – Bad Choice by Experimental                   
Group Contrast……………………………………….55 
 
D. Neuropsychological Results………………………………….57 
E. Trails B……………………………………………………….61 
i. Days 1-3……………………………………………...61 
ii. Decision Quality During Imaging……………………62 
VI. DISCUSSION……………………………………………………67 
VII. LIMITATIONS…………………………………………………..77 
VIII. FUTURE DIRECTIONS………………………………………...78 
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………..80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 v	
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table 1: Summary of Probably, Magnitude, and Expected Value for  
  Each Stimulus.……………………………………………………………...…..32 
 
Table 2: Mean Salivary Cortisol Measurements.……………….…………………...…...41 
Table 3: Mean Sympathetic Measurements During Acute Stress Procedure.………...…43 
 
Table 4: ROIs Indicating Significant Differential Activation Between Positively 
              and Negatively Valenced Stimuli During Learning…………………………….53 
 
Table 5: Description of Raw and Standardized Neuropsychological Tests Scores……...58 
 
 
Table 6: Correlations Between Five Cognitive Variables and Habitual 
              Decisions Post Stress.……………….……………….…………………………61 
 
Table 7: Brain Regions Demonstrating Significant Activation for Each  
              Experimental Contrast……………….……………….……………….………..66 
 
  
	 vi	
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Visual Representation of Learning and Decision Phases…………………...…25 
 
Figure 2: Visual Depiction of Procedural Time Line……………………………......…..31 
. 
Figure 3: Subjective Stress Measure……………………………………………………..39 
 
Figure 4: Cortisol Response Curve………………………………………………………40 
 
Figure 5: Mean Heart Rate and Skin Conductance ……………………………………...42 
Figure 6: Task Acquisition……………………………………………………………….44 
Figure 7: Decision	Quality	During	fMRI	(Day	4) ………………………………………46	
Figure 8: Learning: Positive EV- Negative EV Contrast …………………………….….47 
Figure 9: Learning: Positive EV – Negative EV by Experimental Group Contrast……..49 
Figure 10: Learning: Positive EV – Negative EV by Experimental Group Contrast     
(Pre-Reversal Only)………………………………………………………….51 
 
Figure 11: Decision Quality: Composite Good Choice  – Bad Choice by Experimental  
Group Contrast……………………………………………………………….56 
 
Figure 12: Factor Extraction……………………………………………………………..60 
Figure 13: Task Acquisition and Trails B Median Split…………………………………62 
Figure 14: Decision quality: Composite Good Choice  – Bad Choice Relative to 
Cognitive Flexibility………..………………………………………………..65
	 1	
INTRODUCTION 
Ranging from simple (e.g., deciding what to wear or what to have for lunch) to 
complex (e.g., managing a large portfolio on behalf of thousands in an international 
market or coordinating military activity on the battlefield), decisions can have important 
consequences in terms of the physical and mental health, and therefore well-being, of the 
individual and others.  Just as decision-making is a fundamental process in which people 
engage every day, another unavoidable part of the daily human experience is exposure to 
stress.  Many environmental stimuli can trigger the cascade of physiological changes 
collectively termed the “stress response” including some that are physiological in nature, 
such as physical trauma or exposure to extreme temperatures, and others that are 
psychological, such as work or interpersonal relationship pressure.  It is also clear that 
situations often occur in which decisions must be made under stressful conditions.  
Whether it is the stockbroker making far-reaching financial decisions in the chaotic 
global market or a military official coordinating multiple units on the battlefield under 
adverse and extreme conditions, sound decisions must be made under moderate to severe 
levels of stress.  Therefore, the extent to which stress might influence decision-making is 
a critical topic of interest across many research domains including, but not limited to, the 
fields of psychology, economics, and medicine. 
The research proposed here is meant to advance our understanding of how stress 
influences decision-making, and to examine the neural correlates of stress-related 
alterations in that process.  While individuals are capable of making decisions using 
precise logic and deliberation, their behavior can also be guided by intuitive judgments 
based on past experiences (Reyna, 2004).  The latter necessitates repeated exposure to 
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environmental stimuli in order to form a habitual response to specific cues (i.e., 
conditioning), perhaps leading to decreased reliance on logic and deliberation to guide 
decision-making.  At times this may be beneficial, as in situations with limited time to 
make decisions in an environment that matches the context in which the habit was 
developed (e.g., a well-trained surgeon treating a gun-shot victim, or a first responder to 
the scene of a natural disaster).  That said, over-reliance on habitual behaviors can also 
have adverse consequences (e.g., a military official carrying out a routine strike plan 
without adequately considering the most recent intelligence or changes in the location of 
the battlefield).   
Importantly, this research will add to the current literature through examination of 
a stress-induced shift from deliberative and logical to habitual decision-making.  By 
conducting such an experiment in a functional magnet resonance-imaging (fMRI) 
paradigm, it is possible to examine the neural substrates subserving both types of 
decision-making.  This may provide additional evidence for how the brain recruits 
various regions involved in cognition and processing of reward-related information to 
carry out decisions.  Further, an understanding of the broad impact of stress on this neural 
circuitry may inform other researchers about the specific role of neuromodulators known 
to be involved in the stress response (e.g., corticosteroids and catecholamines) in the 
modulation of decision-making’s locus.   
Additionally, a greater understanding of the neural basis of stress and decision-
making could provide vital insight into the neural basis, development, and treatment of 
disorders influenced by stress.  For example, one long-standing hypothesis underlying the 
etiology of many psychological disorders is the stress-diathesis model (Monroe & 
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Simons, 1991).  This research has the potential to initiate interdisciplinary investigation 
by examining the relationship between stress, brain activation, and cognition, providing 
direct clinical implications for the development of certain psychological disorders (such 
as PTSD and major depression) and for exacerbating existing disorders such as relapse in 
drug addiction.  Research examining this intersection may elucidate interventions aimed 
at changing individuals’ maladaptive cognitive, emotional, and behavioral habits while 
enhancing adaptive habits.  Whether the goal is to inform theoretical and experimental 
neuroscience, or to provide novel clinical interventions, investigation into the effects of 
stress on decision-making should start with a basic understanding of the difference 
between controlled versus automatic decision-making processes. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Dual-Process Theories of Decision-Making 
 Researchers of a wide range of academic disciplines have studied the topic of 
decision-making, at times originating in entirely different perspectives based on different 
assumptions.  Thus, multiple theories of reasoning have been developed (resulting at 
points in varied and confusing terminology).  Across disciplines, however, a common 
trend has emerged: to conceptualize reasoning and decision-making in a dual-process 
manner involving two separable but interacting systems.   
Dual-process theories of decision-making differentiate between systems 
supporting styles of decision-making that are (I) habitual, stimulus-bound, automatic, and 
less effortful versus (II) deliberative, flexible, controlled, more effortful and resource-
dependent.  Though each theory possesses unique characteristics, they all share an 
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approach involving a portrayal of decision-making as dichotomous.  In social 
psychology, this dichotomy is divided into automatic and controlled processes (Shiffrin 
& Schneider, 1977).  In economics, individuals are thought to make decisions based on 
System 1 gut instincts, or System 2 processes that are more deliberate (Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002).  Finally, in behavioral neuroscience, decision-making is generally 
described as being habit-based or goal-directed (Dickinson, 1985).  It should be noted 
that some have raised important concerns with respect to this dichotomy being an 
oversimplification (Evans, 2008), yet as an experimental tool the dichotomy remains 
useful and thus it is adopted here. 
The current project takes a behavioral neuroscience approach, the focus of which 
exists towards the center of a progression of research that sprouted from the early 
learning experiments of Thorndike (1911) and Tolman (1948), and has since led to 
advanced computational models explaining the relative contributions of each form of 
decision-making in different situations (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005).  Situated at the 
center point of this progression, the current project aims to examine the influence of 
stress on decision-making and the neural systems involved.  In keeping with the 
traditional taxonomy of the early behavioral neuroscience work upon which this study is 
directly based, the terminology “goal-directed” and “habit-based” will be adopted 
throughout to describe each system.   
A goal-directed system supports decision-making that is characterized by 
awareness, intentionality, controllability and increased cognitive effort (Bargh, 1996; 
Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).  Goal-directed behaviors are derived from predictions about 
future consequences regarding some action and are therefore mediated by action-outcome 
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(A-O) contingencies (i.e., a casual relationship between behaviors and their resulting 
consequences; Dickinson, 1985)  The habit system, on the other hand, promotes decision-
making characterized by unawareness, unintentionality, lack of control, and decreased 
cognitive effort (Bargh, 1996; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).  Habitual behaviors persist 
even in a changing environment as they are controlled by environmental stimuli, which 
have been repeatedly paired with a response.  Therefore, the habit system is thought to be 
guided by stimulus-response (S-R) associations (i.e., a casual relationship between the 
environmental context and the production of a behavioral response; Dickinson, 1985).  
Accordingly, decisions can be characterized on a continuum of automaticity ranging from 
completely controlled to completely automatic (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999).  In the current 
proposal, our goal is to examine the effects of acute stress on decisions manipulated to be 
closer to the “poles” of that continuum. 
Underlying both goal-directed and habitual behaviors is the concept of 
instrumental conditioning, the process of learning the association between behaviors and 
their consequences (Dickinson, 1985).  Although both systems are thought to be 
concurrently active and competing for behavioral control (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), 
a temporal progression from goal-directed to habitual decision-making throughout the 
process of learning has been observed (Adams, 1982; Dickinson, Balleine, Watt, 
Gonzalez, & Boakes, 1995). That is, early during the learning process, behaviors are 
generally goal-directed and contingent on a behavioral outcome.  After repeated and 
consistent training, however, behaviors can become more habitual.  They can be elicited 
from contiguously related environmental cues and are relatively independent of 
behavioral outcomes (Dickinson, 1985).  This automatization of routine behaviors may 
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serve an adaptive function, as it frees cognitive resources that can be allocated to other, 
non-routine, behaviors (Bargh, 1994).  However, as habits can influence behavior in ways 
of which one is unaware (e.g., Bargh & Morsella, 2008), understanding the factors 
involved in a shift from goal-oriented to habitual decision-making processes is important.   
Goal Devaluation Studies: Measuring the Shift between Systems  
Using an experimental procedure known as outcome devaluation, researchers 
have been able to examine factors that contribute to a dissociation between the goal-
directed and habit-based systems.  Originally utilized in animal research (e.g., Adams & 
Dickinson, 1981; Balleine & Dickinson, 1998; Dickinson, 1985), the general design of 
this procedure begins by training hungry rats to press a lever for a food reward (e.g., 
sucrose pellets).  After sufficient training, the food reward is devalued and responses for 
the reward (now devalued) are measured under extinction.  The process of devaluation 
originally involved pairing consumption of the food reward with a noxious drug (Adams 
& Dickinson, 1981).  More recently, however, devaluation has been achieved through the 
method of selective satiety, in which subjects are allowed free access to consume the 
food reward until satiated prior to the extinction phase (Rossi & Yin, 2012).   
A hallmark of goal-directed action is that it is guided by a learning system that is 
sensitive to the behavior’s outcome or teleological goal (Adams & Dickinson, 1981).  
Therefore, goal-directed behaviors can be examined by the extent to which outcome 
devaluation affects responding during extinction.  That is, if behaviors are guided 
primarily by the prediction of future outcomes, responses for devalued rewards should 
decrease during the initial phase of extinction (a behavioral response that is opposite of 
the typically examined extinction burst).  While the existence of flexible, goal-directed 
	 7	
behaviors may not be unexpected in humans, the results from Adams and Dickinson 
(1981) demonstrating a similar capacity for learning in animals contradicted the 
prevailing theory of that time.  In their experiment, two groups of rats were trained to 
make a lever press for one type of food, while a different type of food was delivered non-
contingently.  Next, the contingent reward was devalued for one group, while the non-
contingent reward was devalued for the other.  During the initial extinction phase, the 
group that experienced the devaluation of the contingent reward responded less 
frequently than the group whose contingent reward remained unaltered.  This lack of 
responding demonstrates some knowledge about the association between the action of 
pressing a lever and the outcome of a particular food (i.e., the A-O contingency). 
Habitual responding has also been demonstrated using the same outcome 
devaluation method described above.  That is, after sufficient overtraining, some subjects 
continued to respond for the devalued reward at the same rate as subjects whose reward 
value remained unchanged.  For example, Adams (1982) devised an experiment in which 
one group of rats were trained to respond for a food reward for ten days, while another 
group was trained for only two days.  For both groups training consisted of 50 rewards 
per day.  After training, the food reward was devalued for half of each group by pairing 
its consumption with a noxious stimulus.  The resulting groups consisted of a moderately 
trained devaluation (100-D) and non-devaluation (100-N) group, and an overtrained 
devaluation (500-D) and non-devaluation (500-N) group.  During the subsequent 
extinction test, the moderately trained rats whose food reward was devalued decreased 
responding compared to rats with the same amount of training whose reward remained 
unchanged (100-D < 100-N).  Contrarily, overtrained rats whose food reward was 
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devalued did not reduce their responding for the devalued reward.  Instead, this group 
lever pressed at a similar rate as the groups whose reward remained unchanged (500-D ≈ 
500-N).  This suggests behaviors can be controlled by the stimuli associated with the 
reward, rather than the reward itself, consistent with the idea of habit formation.  A 
similar shift from goal-directed to habitual responding, as a result of overtraining, has 
also been demonstrated in humans (Tricomi, Balleine, & O'Doherty, 2009). 
Other factors that may contribute to the dominance of either the goal-oriented or 
habit system in a specific context have been investigated.  Of particular interest here is 
the impact of stress.  While both systems provide unique advantages which promote 
adaptive responding, overreliance on either system may lead to undesirable consequences 
(Bargh, 1994).  Several animal and, more recently, human studies have demonstrated 
stress-induced shifts from goal-oriented to habitual responding using paradigms similar to 
the goal devaluation studies just discussed (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009; Schwabe & Wolf, 
2010).  Notably, stress may promote this shift by altering the brain’s reward processing 
circuitry (Schwabe, Tegenthoff, Hoffken, & Wolf, 2012).  Therefore, before discussing 
the finer details of these studies, it is important to briefly review the peripheral and neural 
pathways involved in the stress response and decision-making. 
Major Stress Pathways 
In order to properly respond to stress (i.e., changing environmental demands or 
threat of/actual harm), an organism’s well-being is contingent on its ability to recruit and 
manage resources while maintaining physiological homeostasis.  Two major systems 
critical for maintaining homeostasis are the sympathetic-adrenal-medullary (SAM) axis 
and the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis.  SAM activation and its precipitating 
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events are fast acting, producing functional changes in the body within seconds (McEwen 
& Sapolsky, 1995).  The SAM axis mediates cardiac output by means of post-ganglionic 
neurons innervating the heart, as well as through release of epinephrine from the adrenal 
medulla of the hypothalamus (Seals & Esler, 2000).  Activation of the SAM axis has also 
been demonstrated to stimulate the release of catecholamines such as epinephrine and 
norepinephrine, as well as dopamine neurally (Arnsten, 2009).  Due to the accelerated 
cardiac functioning and the release of catecholamines, SAM activation is responsible for 
increasing arousal in order to prepare the body to respond to threatening or aversive 
stimuli (e.g., fight or flight Cannon, 1932).  These catecholamines have a concentration-
dependent influence over neuronal firing that can be characterized as an inverted U-shape 
relationship.  That is, moderate levels of catecholamines are necessary for optimal neural 
processing, but hypo- or hyper-activity of the system under- or over-excites neurons 
respectively leading to disorganized firing in the latter case as when the system is 
exposed to acute stress (Arnsten, 2009).  For example, it has been observed that excessive 
stress-related release of catecholamines is associated with decrements in working 
memory performance (Arnsten, 2009; Arnsten & Goldman-Rakic, 1998). 
A parallel system, the HPA axis, also mediates homeostasis in response to stress.  
Under conditions of acute stress the hypothalamus sends signals (i.e., corticotrophin 
releasing hormone) to the anterior pituitary gland that in turn activates (via 
adrenocorticotropic hormone) the cortex of the adrenal glands, stimulating the release of 
corticosteroids, such as cortisol, into the bloodstream.  This complex cascade of events 
occurs relatively slowly, with effects reaching peak levels approximately 15-20 minutes 
post-stress (Herman et al., 2003).  Once in the bloodstream, corticosteroids play a critical 
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role in returning the body to a state of homeostasis.  Corticosteroids bind to many of the 
body’s nucleic cells and play a role in metabolizing carbohydrates, increasing blood 
glucose levels.  Increases in blood glucose provide the necessary fuel to meet metabolic 
demand after excess consumption of energy resources (e.g., after responding to a stressful 
situation, Miller & O'Callaghan, 2002).  At the same time, however, corticosteroids can 
influence multiple psychological systems including learning and memory (McEwen & 
Sapolsky, 1995) after brief exposure, and have been associated with several 
psychological disorders after chronic exposure (Herman et al., 2003).  The influence of 
these stress systems on decision-making will be discussed further in later sections. 
Acute Laboratory Stress Techniques 
 In order to induce activation of physiological stress systems in a laboratory 
setting, various forms of acute stress have been utilized in past research.  These range 
from physiological to psychosocial to cognitive stressors.  Importantly, different forms of 
stress may affect brain functioning through separable, but overlapping, pathways 
(Herman & Cullinan, 1997), resulting in varying degrees of activation from each stress 
system.  Various stress induction approaches can be categorized into two broad 
categories: processive and systemic.   
Processive stressors, such as fear conditioning and restraint in animals or public 
speaking in humans, require a sequence of higher order processing to integrate multiple 
sensory inputs with past experiences (Herman & Cullinan, 1997).  Therefore, the amount 
of stress produced by these stressors is directly related to the quality and quantity of 
individuals’ previous exposure.  Evidence for such higher-order processing and 
integration has been demonstrated by lesion studies in which the ability of these stressors 
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to evoke a stress response was inhibited by degradation of prefrontal cortex (PFC), 
amygdala, and hippocampus (Diorio, Viau, & Meaney, 1993; Feldman, Conforti, Itzik, & 
Weidenfeld, 1994; Sapolsky, Krey, & McEwen, 1984, respectively).  For example, 
lesions to the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) significantly increased 
adrenocorticotropin and corticosterone plasma levels following a restraint procedure (i.e., 
a processive stressor) but not after exposure to ether (i.e., a systemic stressor; see below) 
in rats (Diorio et al., 1993). 
Systemic stressors, on the other hand, engender an immediate threat to 
homeostatic functioning.  This category includes physiologic stressors such as ether and 
hypoxia in animals and exposure to extreme heat or cold in humans.  These stressors are 
more likely to evoke respiratory distress and to be interpreted as threatening survival.  
Additionally, the stress response elicited by these stimuli is not affected by lesions to 
PFC, amygdala, and hippocampus (Diorio et al., 1993; Feldman et al., 1994; Sapolsky et 
al., 1984, respectively).  This provides evidence for a more direct pathway to the 
paraventricular nucleus of the hypothalamus, a major originating source of cortisol 
release (Herman & Cullinan, 1997).   
One of the most commonly employed systemic stressors is the cold-pressor test 
(CPT), which involves immersion of the participants’ hand into ice water for a matter of 
minutes (described by Hines & Brown, 1932).  This procedure was originally developed 
for cardiovascular research due to its ability to reliably produce a pressor response (i.e., 
an increase in arterial blood pressure).  CPT has been shown to reliably activate the SAM 
axis (as measured by increased skin conductance [Buchanan, Tranel, & Adolphs, 2006] 
and blood pressure [al’Absi, Petersen, & Wittmers, 2002]), as well as the HPA axis (as 
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measured by mild-to-moderate increases in salivary cortisol [McRae et al., 2006]). 
Perhaps the most frequently used processive stressor is the Trier Social Stress 
Test (TSST).  TSST typically involves participants’ preparing a short speech, followed by 
delivery of said speech, and subsequent verbal performance of difficult mental arithmetic 
in front of a panel of multiple evaluators (often in white lab coats with audio and/or 
visual recording equipment as well; Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993).  Thus, 
creating a situation of social evaluation is critical for the successful implementation of the 
TSST.  Of note, the TSST has been shown to reliably evoke a larger cortisol response 
compared to the CPT (McRae et al., 2006).  That said, it requires greater cost in terms of 
personnel and facility demands making it a difficult protocol to implement.  Completion 
of the full protocol can take 10-25 minutes and requires multiple laboratory personnel 
and space.  The extended time needed to complete the TSST may also present a number 
of methodological confounds.  Further, with an extended stressor it is plausible that 
individual differences in self-regulatory processes may be more likely to increase while 
the ability to disassociate the impact of the SAM and HPA axes on a subsequent 
behavioral task may be reduced.  While the social evaluative component of the TSST has 
been cited as a critical element of its success in evoking strong HPA activation 
(Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004), the TSST is subject to high inter-individual variation as a 
function of age (Kudielka, Schommer, Hellhammer, & Kirschbaum, 2004) and sex 
(Kudielka, Hellhammer, & Kirschbaum, 2007).  Additionally, individual differences in 
comfort level with public speaking may also contribute to individual differences in 
cortisol variations.  While research examining this idea has not yet been conducted, 
representing a gap in the literature, it is consistent with the notion that processive 
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stressors require higher-order processing to trigger the stress response.   
The Brain’s Reward Processing Circuitry 
Notably, some research indicates that stress exposure may influence brain 
function in regions involved in decision-making.  Therefore, it is important to discuss the 
functional anatomy of decision-making, with special attention paid to overlap in stress 
effects on such regions.  As discussed previously, behavior may be guided by two distinct 
systems: one that supports habitual responding (i.e., S-R associations) and one that 
produces goal-directed action, (i.e., A-O associations).  Whether rewards are delivered 
contiguously to bolster S-R associations, or predictably in accordance with interpretable 
contingencies, it is necessary for the organism to possess the capacity to interpret 
stimulus and outcome valence in order to properly direct behavior.  Research indicates 
that reward-related information is detected and processed by diverse brain regions that 
comprise the brain’s “reward processing circuitry” (Rolls, 2000; Schultz, 2000).   
That specific brain regions are important for processing rewarding stimuli was 
first demonstrated by Olds and Milner (1954), after observing persistent self-stimulation 
of several limbic structures in rats.  Since that time, researchers have developed a 
functional schematic of the brain’s reward processing functions (the meso-limbic 
dopamine system; Pierce & Kumaresan, 2006).  Though variations in roles attributed to 
specific anatomy exist in the literature, this system is generally comprised of dopamine 
pathways linking together the ventral tegmental area (VTA), ventral and dorsal striatum, 
septum, hippocampus, amygdala, and prefrontal cortex (Ikemoto, 2007).  For the 
purposes of the current study, primary attention is given to the prefrontal cortex and 
striatum.  That said, both of these regions can be divided into independent but 
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overlapping areas, demarcated either by structural or functional characteristics, and play 
critical roles in reward processing. 
Prefrontal cortex.  The prefrontal cortex (PFC) is a large and functionally 
heterogeneous portion of cortex with multiple anatomical subdivisions.  In the broadest 
sense, PFC is implicated in higher-order processes and executive functioning such as 
planning, flexible thinking, working memory, and decision-making (among others; Wood 
& Grafman, 2003).  While the PFC can be divided along many structural and functional 
lines, given their well-documented role in reward processing and decision-making this 
proposal will focus primarily on the subdivisions that comprise the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC), medial PFC (mPFC), and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC).   
The ACC is a relatively large brain region comprised of multiple sub-regions, 
which have been implicated in various cognitive and emotional processes (for review see 
Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000).  More specifically, the ACC has been consistently 
implicated in multiple functions involving processing of reward-related information.  
ACC activation has been observed during monitoring or correcting errors on various 
cognitive tasks (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001), as well as during 
punishment trials (e.g., the loss of a monetary reward) during an incentive delay task 
(Knutson, Westdorp, Kaiser, & Hommer, 2000).  The ACC has also been implicated for 
differential neuronal firing for positive and negative visual stimuli (i.e., increased 
responding for positive and decreased responding for negative stimuli), as well as for 
behaviors that led to painful (e.g., shock) or pleasant (e.g., food) consequences (Nishijo et 
al., 1997).  Studies aimed at identifying functional differences within the ACC have 
implicated the dorsal portions of this region in higher cognitive functioning, while the 
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ventral ACC has been associated more with emotional processes (see Drevets & Raichle, 
1998).  Additionally, the processing of reward-related information (using a design similar 
to those discussed above) has also been linked more specifically to dorsal ACC (Bush et 
al., 2002). 
The mPFC and OFC play a similar, yet distinct, role in reward processing.  
Though the anatomical boundaries between these two regions are somewhat blurred, 
functional heterogeneities may allow for their division (Ongur & Price, 2000).  Within 
the OFC, distinct regional activation is observed as a result of positive (glucose) and 
aversive (salt) taste (O'Doherty, Rolls, Francis, Bowtell, & McGlone, 2001).  Similar 
findings have been demonstrated using smell (Rolls, Kringelbach, & de Araujo, 2003), 
touch (Rolls, O'Doherty, et al., 2003) hearing (Blood, Zatorre, Bermudez, & Evans, 
1999) and vision (O'Doherty et al., 2003).  Studies have also demonstrated OFC 
activation in response to more abstract rewards, such as money (O'Doherty, Kringelbach, 
Rolls, Hornak, & Andrews, 2001).  These results highlight the role for this region in 
processing rewarding and aversive environmental stimuli.  Interestingly, several reports 
suggest spatial segregation between responses to rewards and punishments within OFC.  
Specifically, medial activation to rewards and lateral activation in response to punishment 
have been observed (for review see, Haber & Knutson, 2010; Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004; 
Porcelli & Delgado, 2009). 
While OFC appears to play a role in differentiating stimuli valence (i.e., 
differential activation for positive versus negative stimuli), the mPFC may be more 
associated with predicting rewards and planning action based on reward outcome 
(Amodio & Frith, 2006; Knutson & Cooper, 2005).  In one study, activity in mPFC 
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increased when monetary rewards were delivered consistent with expectation, and 
decreased when expected rewards were withheld (Knutson, Fong, Bennett, Adams, & 
Hommer, 2003).  Studies also suggest that mPFC is sensitive to anticipated magnitude 
and probability of rewards (Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman, Peterson, & Glover, 2005; 
Yacubian et al., 2006), as well as reward immediacy (Ballard & Knutson, 2009).  It is 
noteworthy that the functional demarcation between OFC and mPFC is a source of 
ongoing research.  Multiple studies have demonstrated the aforementioned mPFC 
characteristics in medial OFC as well (Hare, O'Doherty, Camerer, Schultz, & Rangel, 
2008; Plassmann, O'Doherty, & Rangel, 2007; Rolls, McCabe, & Redoute, 2008).   
The PFC has also been implicated as being particularly vulnerable to the effects 
of acute stress (i.e., increases in catecholamines and glucocorticoids).  This effect has 
been demonstrated by stress-induced impairment on behavioral tasks requiring cognitive 
flexibility (Alexander, Hillier, Smith, Tivarus, & Beversdorf, 2007) and working memory 
(Luethi, Meier, & Sandi, 2008).  This negative impact is likely due to a synergistic 
interaction between catecholamines (e.g., dopamine, noradrenaline, and serotonin) and 
glucocorticoids (e.g., cortisol; Arnsten, 2009).  In experiments measuring single neurons 
during a spatial working memory task, acute stress disrupted typical neuronal firing in 
PFC (Funahashi, Bruce, & Goldman-Rakic, 1989).  At the same time, researchers have 
demonstrated stress-induced dopamine increases in PFC (Finlay, Zigmond, & 
Abercrombie, 1995) and pharmacological dopamine antagonists successfully ameliorate 
stress-induced impairment (Arnsten & Goldman-Rakic, 1998).  Evidence for stress 
related impairment of PFC functioning also originates in studies employing multiple 
imaging modalities.  For example, deactivation of mPFC after a psychosocial stressor has 
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been demonstrated using both positron emission topography (PET) and functional magnet 
resonance imaging (fMRI; Pruessner et al., 2008).  Given influence of acute stress on 
PFC activity as represented in these studies, it is not surprising that PFC-based cognitive 
functions could be altered under conditions of acute stress. 
Striatum.  Another brain region critical for coding subjective value of external 
stimuli is the striatum.  The striatum, along with globus pallidus, substantia nigra, and 
subthalamic nucleus, is a collection of subcortical nuclei that comprises the basal ganglia 
(Graybiel, 2000).  The striatum receives most of the input from the neocortex.  Other 
basal ganglia output information to the thalamus, which is relayed to PFC and other 
frontal regions, creating a series of parallel loops (Graybiel, 2000; Knutson, Delgado, & 
Phillips, 2008).  The anatomy and function of these loops remain an exciting topic of 
interest for many researchers (for review see Pennartz et al., 2009), however, the current 
study focuses primarily on the various subdivisions of thestriatum.  The degree to which 
the striatum may be sub-divided in terms of structures is dependent on the spatial 
resolution of the chosen imaging technique (e.g., PET versus fMRI), as well as the 
particular species being observed.  In human fMRI studies, the striatum is generally 
divided into a ventral region, comprised of the nucleus accumbens (NAcc), and a dorsal 
region, comprised of the caudate (dorsomedial) and putamen (dorsolateral).   
The ventral striatum has been consistently implicated in the anticipation or 
prediction of monetary gains (Knutson et al., 2008), whereas the dorsal striatum may be 
more important for processing rewarding versus non-rewarding outcomes (Delgado, 
Locke, Stenger, & Fiez, 2003; Delgado, Nystrom, Fissell, Noll, & Fiez, 2000).  The 
degree to which the outcome of a decision is congruent with the prediction is known as a 
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prediction error (Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997).  Interestingly, time course analyses 
of prediction errors for gain-related stimuli demonstrate earlier activation of ventral 
striatum, followed by activation of dorsal striatum up to four seconds later (Knutson et 
al., 2008).  This temporal pattern of activation may represent a spatial-temporal flow of 
information.  That is, basic reward information may first be processed by NAcc before 
being gradually integrated with other information via the striatal-hypothalamus-PFC 
loop, which moves dorsally through the striatum in a spiral fashion (Knutson et al., 
2008). 
Similar to OFC, stress-induced changes to striatum have also been observed.  For 
example, in an animal model, acute stress (intermittent tail shock) is related to increased 
extracellular dopamine in ventral and dorsal striatum (Abercrombie, Keefe, DiFrischia, & 
Zigmond, 1989) and chronic stress led to hypertrophy (i.e., increased neuronal density 
and dendritic length) in dorsolateral and atrophy in dorsomedial striatum (Dias-Ferreira et 
al., 2009).  These studies demonstrate sensitivity of striatum to stress and provide 
evidence for the implicating role of dopamine.  The functional differences between 
dorsolateral and dorsomedial striatum are of particular importance to this proposal and 
will be discussed further in the next section. 
Other reward-related regions.  Three other reward-related brain regions, while 
not a primary focus here, are noteworthy.  First, the VTA, located near the midline of the 
ventral portion of the midbrain, serves as the origin of many excitatory pathways that 
comprise the reward network (Oades & Halliday, 1987).  In addition to its excitatory 
projections to various reward regions, the VTA also receives information from the 
hippocampus (Lisman & Grace, 2005).  In contrast to the frontal regions, which may be 
	 19	
important for the processing of rewarding and punishing stimuli, the hippocampus is 
important for storing information regarding the environmental contexts for which 
positive and negative stimuli are experienced (Fuchs, Eaddy, Su, & Bell, 2007).  This 
information is then transmitted to VTA in order to activate or inhibit further excitation of 
the reward network (Luo, Tahsili-Fahadan, Wise, Lupica, & Aston-Jones, 2011).  A final 
region of the reward circuitry worth mentioning is the amygdala.  Located deep and 
medially within the temporal lobe, this almond-shaped region has consistently been 
associated with negative (for review see Calder, Lawrence, & Young, 2001) and positive 
states of arousal (Hamann & Mao, 2002).  Stress hormones, such as noradrenaline and 
cortisol, have been associated with greater amygdala activation and enhanced memory 
consolidation for emotionally arousing event (for review see, Roozendaal, McEwen, & 
Chattarji, 2009).  Therefore, the extent to which learning from environmental rewards 
and punishments evokes an emotional response, the amygdala plays a crucial role in the 
reward network.  While all of the above brain regions play a critical role in decision-
making, for the purpose of the current project the next section will look only at research 
implicating the PFC and striatum.   
Learning and Decision-Making in the PFC and Striatum 
The PFC and striatum’s role in processing pleasant and aversive stimuli make 
these regions especially critical for learning and decision-making.  Associations between 
flexible, adaptive decision-making and OFC have been consistently demonstrated using 
experimental paradigms including single neuron recordings in non-human primates 
(Tremblay & Schultz, 2000) and a variety of PET and fMRI techniques in humans 
(Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004; Schoenbaum, Setlow, Saddoris, & Gallagher, 2003; 
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Tremblay & Schultz, 2000).  The OFC has also been implicated in the learning of 
contingencies related to complex decision-making tasks (Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, & 
Damasio, 1996) and appropriately altering behavioral responses in reversal learning tasks 
(Rahman, Sahakian, Hodges, Rogers, & Robbins, 1999).  In OFC-lesioned animals, the 
Pavlovian association between cues predictive of food (CS) and approach behavior (UR) 
was inhibited (Chudasama & Robbins, 2003).  In the same study, OFC lesions also 
produced more maladaptive perseverative responding in a behavioral paradigm in which 
previously learned reward contingencies were altered (Chudasama & Robbins, 2003). 
Within the striatum, various aspects of learning and decision-making can also be 
disassociated.  Action-outcome learning and flexible, goal-directed decisions have been 
demonstrated to be associated primarily with dorsomedial striatum/caudate nuclei, while 
rigid and habitual behaviors, characteristic of stimulus-response relationships, are 
primarily associated with the dorsolateral striatum/putamen (Graybiel, 1998; Hikosaka, 
Takikawa, & Kawagoe, 2000).  In rodents, lesion and pharmacological inactivation of 
dorsolateral striatum have been shown to render habit-based decisions sensitive to 
contingency manipulations (Yin, Knowlton, & Balleine, 2004; 2005, respectively).  
Similarly, pharmacological GABA agonists injected into the caudate region of non-
human primate subjects inhibited acquisition of learning new motor tasks, while 
suppression of putamen disrupted previously overtrained responses (Miyachi, Hikosaka, 
Miyashita, Karadi, & Rand, 1997).  Additionally, electrical stimulation of caudate 
immediately after a correct behavioral response has been shown to augment learning 
(Nakamura & Hikosaka, 2006).   
Possessing dual circuitry that enables habitual and goal-directed systems allows 
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for maximum reward gains across many situations with varying degrees of certainty 
(Daw et al., 2005).  However, it is plausible that over-reliance of either system would 
lead to disadvantageous outcomes (Bargh, 1996).  Recent evidence suggests that acute 
stress may disrupt the natural interaction between these two systems.  The overarching 
hypothesis of the current study is that exposure to acute stress will elicit a shift toward 
habitual decision-making, leading to negative outcomes in this particular context (i.e., 
rather than making goal-directed decisions based on new information that will lead to 
some reward, participants will rely on outdated information that is no longer relevant).  
Similar designs have revealed stress-induced shifts toward habitual responding in animals 
(Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009) and humans (Schwabe & Wolf, 2009, 2010) using food 
reinforcement.  Specifically, these studies trained subjects to perform two instrumental 
responses, associated with specific stimuli, in order to gain two separate food rewards.  
After sufficient training, one of the two food rewards was devalued through selective 
satiety (i.e., subjects are allowed free access to one of the foods until that food is no 
longer wanted).  Next, responses to the individual stimuli are measured in the absence of 
any reward.  Results showed that when stress preceded instrumental conditioning, 
subjects responded equally to the stimuli associated with both the devalued and the non-
devalued food reward.  That is, stress facilitated habitual behavior by decreasing subjects’ 
sensitivity to the changes in the value of food outcomes.   
To the researcher’s knowledge, this project is the first to examine a similar effect 
using a potent secondary reinforcer (i.e., money).  Instead of using selective satiety to 
devalue a food reward, previously learned monetary values associated with task stimuli 
were altered via contingency reversal.  Effectively this operationalizes the manner in 
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which real-world decisions can be associated with an ever-changing environment, 
necessitating that individuals alter their decision-making style to function optimally.  
Participants were then given the opportunity to make decisions for actual money based on 
these recently learned values, but they must abstain from responding in a way that would 
have been optimal pre-reversal in order to maximize their winnings.  Thus, the current 
study pits participants’ responses previously overtrained to the point of habit against 
newly acquired information requiring utilization of goal-directed decision-making.  If 
acute stress promotes a shift in decision-making from goal-oriented to habitual, the 
current design should be able to detect this change. 
There are three central aims to this project.  First, to develop evidence for the 
hypothesis that stress exposure promotes expression of habitual financial decisions over 
logical and deliberative ones.  It is expected that the results of the proposed experiment 
will support this hypothesis.  If supported, this will add to the growing body of stress 
research and help to inform researchers and clinicians of the behavioral tendencies 
induced by stress.  Similar designs have reliably shown stress-induced reliance on habit 
performance in animals.  Few studies, however, have been designed to test the same 
principles in humans.  Importantly, the current design is the first known attempt to 
examine stress-induced shift from goal-oriented to habit-based using a potent secondary 
reinforcer (i.e., money).  Results from this study would likely spur future research 
designed to explore, more specifically, how to manage increased stress to make more 
advantageous decisions.  
Second, this project aims to determine the neural basis of stress’ promotion of 
habitual financial behaviors using fMRI.  Toward this end, two specific hypotheses are 
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tested. First, it is hypothesized that regions of PFC and dorsomedial striatum will exhibit 
reduced responses to stimuli in those participants exposed to acute stress. Second, 
stressed participants will demonstrate enhanced dorsolateral striatal activation consistent 
with a shift from goal-directed to habitual decisions whereas non-stressed participants’ 
decision-related striatal activation will be dorsomedially centered with additional reward-
related activation in OFC.  While multiple studies have examined neural activation of 
stress’ effects on memory, the results from the current research would add to the dearth of 
imaging literature related to decision-making. 
Third, this research aims to examine the extent to which neuropsychological 
measures of executive functioning impacts the effects of habitual financial responding 
under conditions of acute stress.  The current study also examines various 
neuropsychological constructs (e.g., working memory, attention, and inhibitory control) 
in order to assess potential risk/protective factors related to stress-induced changes in 
decision-making behavior.  While there is recent evidence implicating greater working-
memory capacity as protecting goal-oriented decision-making after stress (Otto, Raio, 
Chiang, Phelps, & Daw, 2013), this idea is largely exploratory.  It is hypothesized that 
higher functioning in these executive domains will attenuate the shift from controlled, to 
automatic decision-making processes under stress.  These domains of executive 
functioning have been implicated to play a vital role in the development of substance use 
disorder and relapse is often brought about by acute stress.  Therefore, the effect of 
individual differences in executive functioning on stress’ impact on decision-making is of 
particular interest. 
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METHOD 
Overview 
The current study took place over four days.  On day one, participants arrived at 
Marquette University and completed a cognitive test battery, questionnaires, and began 
learning an instrumental conditioning procedure.  Baseline physiological measures were 
also collected during this time.  On days two and three, participants engaged in the same 
instrumental conditioning task in order to facilitate a habitual pattern of responding.  On 
the fourth and final day, participants arrived at the Medical College of Wisconsin and 
participated in a short stress (or control) procedure before completing two instrumental 
conditioning tasks in an MRI paradigm.  The first task was the same conditioning task 
completed on days one through three.  The second task was similar, except it required 
participants to reverse their now overtrained pattern of responding.  Physiological 
measures (e.g., heart rate, blood pressure, skin conductance, and salivary cortisol) were 
collected before and after the stress procedure, and during the conditioning task inside the 
scanner.  All study procedures were approved by the Medical College of Wisconsin 
Institutional Review Board. 
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            Figure 1. Visual depiction of procedural time line. 
Participants  
Participants were solicited through a variety of means including flyer postings 
around Milwaukee and surrounding areas, newspaper ads, Internet postings, and word of 
mouth.  In order to control for numerous environmental, behavioral, medical, and 
psychological conditions that could have a negative impact on the interpretation of study 
results, participants were excluded if they reported a history or evidence of: 1) 
neurological illnesses/conditions, such as motor or vocal tics (including a diagnosis of 
Tourette’s syndrome), head trauma with significant loss of consciousness (>30 min), 
cerebral ischemia, vascular headache, carotid artery disease, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, 
brain tumor, dementia (including Alzheimer’s disease and Mild Cognitive Impairment), 
chronic meningitis, multiple sclerosis, pernicious anemia, normal-pressure 
hydrocephalus, HIV infection, Parkinson’s disease, and Huntington's disease; 2) severe 
medical illnesses/conditions that may affect brain function, such as untreated 
hypertension, cardiac disease, insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus, endocrine disorders, 
renal disease, glaucoma, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; 3) major psychiatric 
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disturbance meeting DSM-5 criteria; or 4) substance abuse meeting DSM-5 criteria.  
Additionally, participants were excluded from the study if they indicated taking 
prescribed psychoactive medications, or if they reported a history of cigarette or nicotine 
use.  Participants were also excluded if they refused to refrain from alcohol use for 24 
hours and caffeine use for 12 hours prior to testing.   
In order to insure the safety of all participants and study personnel, additional 
exclusionary criteria were adopted specific to magnetic resonance (MR) scanning.  These 
included: pregnancy, weight inappropriate for height, ferrous objects within the body, 
low visual acuity, and a history of claustrophobia.  In addition, children ages 17 and 
younger are excluded from this study.   
Finally, given the role of stress in the proposed study, additional exclusionary 
criteria apply in order to ensure participants' safety.  These include: a history of 
cardiovascular illness (including but not limited to aneurysm, heart attack, congenital 
heart abnormalities, untreated hypertension), chronic rheumatologic disease, diabetes, 
Reynaud’s Disease, and Cold Urticaria.  Also, because prescribed contraceptives 
influence endogenous hormone levels (including cortisol – a major dependent variable in 
the proposed study), women taking prescription birth control were excluded.   
Of 90 total individuals screened, 31 met all eligibility requirements and provided 
informed consent.  One participant failed to complete the MRI scanning protocol due to 
scheduling limitations.  Two participants’ data were excluded due to initial MRI technical 
errors.  The resulting sample of 28 participants (14 men and 14 women) ranging in age 
from 18-53 (M =23.21, SD = 6.93) and all right-handed successfully completed the entire 
study protocol.   
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In order to retain participants, they were contacted via email or phone messages to 
remind them of their scheduled time.  As compensation for their time, participants were 
paid $10 per hour for participation on Days 1-3 and $15 per hour on day 4 (i.e., involving 
MRI scanning).  Total participation time was approximately 6 hours over 4 days.  In 
addition, participants had the opportunity to earn bonus monetary compensation (between 
$1 and $15) based on choices made in the financial decision-making task.  This is a 
standard in economic research, because if participants enter into a financial decision they 
know is hypothetical (i.e., not resulting in actual monetary outcomes), their decision-
making is altered. 
Sample Size Justification 
A power analysis was conducted using G*power  (G*Power 3.0: Erdfelder, Faul, 
& Buchner, 1996) assuming a small effect size, (0.25, less than observed in similar work; 
e.g., [Schwabe & Wolf, 2009]), 2 experimental groups (Stress vs. No Stress) and 2 
symbol valences (Reward vs. Aversive).  Results indicated that in order to attain an 
effective power of 0.8 in decisions made for an experimental group x symbol valence 
interaction during day 4 tasks (i.e., those performed during MRI scanning), a minimum 
sample size of 34 would be required, though this is a conservative estimate as we expect 
a moderate effect size.   
Procedures 
Informed consent.  When participants arrived on day one they were given an 
overview of the study purpose and a detailed description of the study procedures.  The 
researcher then walked through each part of the consent form, explaining each step.  
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During each of these procedures the researcher solicited questions and answered any that 
arose.  Afterward, the researcher asked them to read it in its entirety and ask any 
remaining questions.  The researcher and participant then signed and study procedures 
began afterward.  Informed consent and study instructions took place again at the 
Medical College of Wisconsin on day four (prior to MRI scanning).  Following the 
signature, participants were screened for (a) MRI Safety Exclusions (using the official 
MCW metal screening form), and (b) Stress Safety Exclusions, prior to continuing with 
additional cognitive testing, surveys, questionnaires, as well as behavioral tasks and MRI 
scanning. 
Cognitive test battery and other measures (Day 1).  Day one procedures 
included safety screening to protect participants from MRI and stress related injuries.  
After meeting the proper safety criteria, informed consent was completed.  Next, 
participants were administered a brief neuropsychological test battery, which is briefly 
outlined below. 
Digit span.  In order to examine working memory, the forward (DF), backward 
(DF), and sequencing (DS) digit span tasks from (WAIS-IV) were administered.  These 
tasks require participants to manipulate information for a brief period of time and are 
widely used in neuropsychological research and clinical assessment (Wechsler, 1939). 
Color-word inference.  In order to assess inhibition and cognitive flexibility, 
participants were also asked to complete a computerized color-word inference task based 
on the original Stroop procedure (Stroop, 1935).  A series of words were displayed on the 
screen, one at a time, in various hues.  The relationship between the word’s hue and its 
semantic meaning was either congruent (e.g., the word “yellow” displayed in a yellow 
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hue), incongruent (e.g., the word “blue” displayed in a red hue), or neutral (e.g., the word 
“jacket” displayed in a green hue).  The participants were asked to identify the color of 
each word presented on the screen by selecting a corresponding key on a number pad.  A 
model of the response possibilities and their representative locations on the keypad (e.g., 
Digit 1 – Yellow; Digit 2 = Red; Digit 3 = Blue; Digit 4 = Green) remained at the bottom 
of the screen throughout the task.   
Conners continuous performance test, 3rd edition (CPT3).  The CPT3 was 
administered to assess sustained attention, vigilance, and impulsivity (Conner, 2014).  In 
this computerized program, a series of letters are displayed on a computer screen one at a 
time.  The participant was instructed to make a space bar response for every stimuli 
presentation except if the stimulus is an “X”.  The task takes 15 minutes to complete and 
uses a variable inter-stimulus-interval (ISI) and inter-stimulus-event rate.    
Symbol-digit modalities test.  In order to measure processing speed, visual 
scanning, and applied nonverbal learning, the Symbol-digit Modalities Test and Digit 
Copy Test was administered (Smith, 1982).  The former task required participants to 
substitute numbers for randomly presented symbols as quickly as possible.   
Trail making test (TMT) A & B.  TMT B assesses visual scanning, processing 
speed, and mental flexibility (Tombaugh, 2004).  TMT-A requires participants to draw a 
line connecting 12 letters and 13 numbers randomly distributed numbers in sequential 
order, alternating between numbers and letters (e.g., 1-A-2-B-3-C, etc.).   
The purpose of the neuropsychological battery is to gather information regarding 
individual differences in cognitive flexibility generally and working memory, impulsivity 
and processing speed specifically.  These differences might serve as moderators of habit 
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acquisition and stress-induced changes observed during the reversal instrumental 
conditioning task.   
Instrumental conditioning task procedures Days 1-3.  The instrumental 
conditioning procedure requires participants to form preferences regarding multiple 
visual stimuli (e.g., colored squares presented on a computer screen) that are associated 
with specific monetary values (i.e., gains or losses of money; see Figure 2).  Days one 
through three consisted of alternating “Learning” and “Decision” phases for a total of 
four phases.  During the learning phase, participants were shown a single stimulus and 
had three seconds to make a button press.  The button press reveals the monetary value 
associated with that stimulus.  There are 8 total stimuli and each are presented eight times 
during each learning phase.   
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Figure 2.  Visual representation of learning and decision phases.  A) Two learning trials 
in which the stimulus is presented for two seconds, follow by one second of feedback, 
and a variable ITI with an average presentation of four seconds.  B) Decision trial in 
which participants have two seconds to respond (via keyboard button press or scanner 
button box) followed by a variable four second ITI.  C) List of each stimuli and 
associated pre-reversal EVs. 
 
Importantly, each stimulus differs in terms of the magnitude, as well as, the 
probability of reward (Table 1).  Participants were informed that no winnings or losses 
would occur during the learning phase.  Next, during the decision phase, participants 
were asked to make decisions between counterbalanced pairs of the same visual stimuli 
in the absence of feedback.  The purpose of the decision phases is to assess how well the 
participants have learned the reward/cost associated with each stimulus.  Participants 
were told that responses made during the decision phase would result in real-life financial 
outcomes. 
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Table 1 
Summary Of Probability, Magnitude, and Expected Value for Each Stimulus 
 
Stimulus pWIN pLOSS 
Payoff-Win 
(x) 
Payoff-Loss 
(y) EV 
Blue Square 0.875 0.125 4 2 3 
Aqua Square 0.625 0.375 4 2 1 
Red Square 0.875 0.125 0.5 0.25 0.375 
Pink Square 0.625 0.375 0.5 0.25 0.125 
Green Square 0.375 0.625 0.5 0.25 -0.125 
Orange Square 0.125 0.875 0.5 0.25 -0.375 
Purple Square 0.375 0.625 4 2 -1 
Yellow Square 0.125 0.875 4 2 -3 
Note.  The first four stimuli have a positive expected value (EV) and the last four have a 
negative EV.  Stimuli with positive EV are considered advantageous, as they are more 
likely to result in a win compared to a loss.  EV = (pS+ * x) – (pS- * y) where pS+ = 
probability of a gain; pS- = probability of loss; x = magnitude of win; and y = magnitude 
of loss.  The pairings between EV and stimuli are reversed for the reversal task.  
 
Day 4 (Scan Day).  The fourth and final day took place during scanning at MCW.  
Participants underwent an acute stress procedure (see Stress Induction section below), 
followed by the instrumental conditioning task (20-30 minutes later) inside the scanner.  
While in the scanner, participants completed one learning phase followed by two decision 
phases according to the same probability schedule as days one through three.  Next, 
participants were informed that the stimulus-associations were altered.  They completed 
one learning phase in which the associated reward-stimulus pairings were reversed (i.e., 
the stimuli previously associated with rewards were then associated with losses and vice 
versa).  Following the reversal-learning phase, the participants completed two “reversal 
decision phases.” At no time did the financial outcomes of this task detract from 
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participants’ compensation for participation in the study.  Rather, they had the 
opportunity to win additional bonus compensation (e.g., $0-$15) based on the choices 
they make during financial tasks (via randomly selected trials that were given to the 
participant at the completion of the study).   
Physiological Measurements 
Prior to entry into the scanner (e.g., before, during, and after the stress induction 
procedure, see below), participants' blood pressure and heart rate were recorded using an 
Omron automatic blood pressure monitor.  Similarly, continuous HR, skin conductance, 
and respiration were recorded using a Biopac MP150 system.  A GE scanner system was 
used to continuously record blood oxygen content via pulse oximetry and respiration.  A 
Biopac MP150 system using MRI-safe amplifiers, leads, and electrodes were also used to 
continuously collect skin conductance levels during scanning from two sensors on the 
non-dominant hand and heart rate (via electrocardiogram using standard 3-lead with 
MRI-safe disposable electrodes).   
Further, saliva samples were acquired prior to and during MRI scanning (e.g., a 
baseline sample before stress induction and a series of 5 samples over the remainder of 
the protocol) in order to measure salivary cortisol and alpha amylase levels.  Samples 
were collected using a Salimetrics Oral Swab (Salimetrics, LLC, State College, PA) 
placed in a swab storage tube.  All samples were placed in freezer storage (identified by 
number only) in a locked room in the psychology department at Marquette University 
prior to assaying.  Saliva samples were assayed by study key personnel at Marquette’s 
Biochemical and Immunoserological Core Laboratory.  A competitive enzyme 
immunoassay technique was used to determine salivary cortisol concentration.  The test 
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uses 25 µl of saliva with a lower limit sensitivity of 0.19 nmol/L and a standard curve 
range of 0.33 to 82.77 nmol/L.  Assays were conducted in duplicate and average cortisol 
concentrations were obtained.  Intra- and inter-assay coefficients were 8.26% and 7.38%, 
respectively.   
Stress Induction 
 On the fourth day, approximately 20 minutes prior to task performance [as 
cortisol levels have been shown to peak 20-30 minutes after acute stress (Duncko, 
Cornwell, Cui, Merikangas, & Grillon, 2007)], participants randomly allotted to the 
experimental condition underwent a physiological stressor with a social evaluative 
component: the socially evaluative cold pressor, a novel variant of the cold pressor test 
(Schwabe, Haddad, & Schachinger, 2008).  This task involves the participant placing 
their hand in ice-cold water (2-4 degrees Celsius) for a period of three minutes.  
Additionally, participants were instructed to stare into the lens of a camera while being 
observed by study key personnel as part of the social evaluative component.  The 
combination of physiological and social stress has been shown to have a cumulative 
effect on the body’s stress response and was used in the current study to maximize stress.  
The no-stress control group was asked to immerse their hand in room temperature water, 
with no evaluation or camera, for a similar period of time. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Psychophysiological Data 
Hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis (HPA) measures.  A 2 (Stress Group) x 4 
(Sample) mixed ANOVA was used to examine main effects and interactions in salivary 
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cortisol levels.  
Sympathetic-adrenal medullary (SAM) axis measures.  Skin conductance 
levels (SCL) were calculated as the average waveform (in microsiemens [µS]) during a 3-
min period of baseline activity before the start of the conditioning task on Day 2.  On the 
fourth day, SCL was calculated in the same manner during three, 3-minute bins in the 
mock scanner room at MCW.  The first bin was collected after a minimum of 20 minutes 
of habituation.  The second bin was collected during the 3 minutes of the socially 
evaluative cold pressor test (vs. control).  Finally, SCL was measured for 3 minutes 
immediately following the stress procedure.   Heart rate (HR) and blood pressure 
measures were collected in the same manner.  Data were analyzed using a mixed 
ANOVA along the variables of interest specific to each task (as above).   
Behavioral Data  
For decision-making portions of the task, where participants were presented with 
a choice between two stimuli per trial, choice of the stimulus that optimizes financial 
gains (i.e., associated with a higher monetary gain or lower loss than the other stimulus in 
the pair) are considered “good” whereas the opposite choice are considered “bad”.  For 
example, if presented with two stimuli where the first was associated with +$1 and the 
second -$1, choice of the first would be “good” and the second “bad”.  Similarly, faced 
with a choice between a stimulus associated with -$5 versus -$1, choice of the second 
would be considered “good”.  The proportion of “good” and “bad” choices participants 
made over the course of each task was the primary dependent variable, and was examined 
via 2-way mixed-design ANOVA incorporating experimental group and participant 
decision quality (i.e., good/bad).  Greenhouse Geisser adjustments were applied to 
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degrees of freedom as necessary to correct for sphericity violations if needed.  
Additionally reaction time was analyzed via a 2-way mixed-design ANOVA 
incorporating the factors of experimental group and outcome valence.  The independent 
variables for this analysis consisted of stress group (SECPT or control) and reversal 
phase (pre-reversal versus post-reversal. 
Neuropsychological Measures 
The total number of errors for all incongruent trials on the color-word inference 
task was used to measure inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility.  In order to measure 
impulse control, commissions – erroneous responses to target stimulus, X, were 
examined.  Additionally, total time for completion on the symbol-digit modalities test 
was collected, yielding a measure of processing speed and WAIS-IV scores for Digit 
Span (total) measured working memory. Finally, total time to complete Trails B, was 
computed to obtain a measure of visual scanning and cognitive flexibility. 
fMRI Analysis 
fMRI data were generated and analyzed using BrainVoyager QX (Goebel, 2012).  
Preprocessing involved motion correction (six-parameter, three-dimensional motion 
correction), spatial smoothing (4-mm FWHM), voxel-wise linear detrending, high-pass 
filtering of frequencies (3 cycles per time course) and normalization to Talairach 
stereotaxic space (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988).  The number of activated voxels, whole 
brain and functionally defined regions of interest (ROI), was then calculated.  Each voxel 
time series was temporally shifted to account for time differences in slice acquisition and 
spatially registered to reduce effects of motion using a rigid body iterative linear least 
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squares method.  Motion parameters assessed during functional scans were incorporated 
as nuisance regressors.   
Our rapid event related design consisted of trials spaced closely together in time, 
leading to a significant overlap of the hemodynamic response function. Relying on the 
assumption that the hemodynamic response function follows the principle of linearity, 
however, the overlapping responses can be dissociated using deconvolution analysis (or 
finite-impulse responding; FIR). First, general linear models (GLM) were defined at the 
single-subject level in which a set of shifted stick functions associated with each of the 10 
TRs from stimulus onset was generated for predictors of interest (e.g., specific predictors 
for each stimuli associated with a particular EV in the learning phase, participants’ 
decision quality in the decision phase, etc.). Thus, each stick function covered a span of 
20 seconds after trial onset. These were regressed onto the dependent variable of blood-
oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) changes within the brain (i.e., fMRI’s dependent 
measure of “brain activity”). Next, participants’ whole-brain time-course data were z-
transformed, prior to entry into a second-level random effects group GLM. Finally, 
contrasts were performed to examine variations in BOLD associated with the fourth and 
fifth stick functions of predictors of interest (6-10 seconds after stimulus onset, 
approximating the potential temporal peak of the HRF). 
If possible, contrasts were corrected for multiple comparisons by false discovery 
rate (FDR; Forman et al., 1995).  When no clusters survived FDR correction, cluster-
level corrections (Goebel, Esposito, & Formisano, 2006) were implemented. Specifically, 
the voxel level threshold was set to p = .005 and a minimum cluster size threshold was 
calculated based on a Monte Carlo simulation procedure.  This procedure quantifies the 
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minimum cluster size necessary to achieve false positive rates of less than 5% at the 
cluster level.  Based on this whole brain analysis, parameter estimates were extracted and 
analyzed using contrasts which parallel the central variables of the task: (a) stress vs. no 
stress, (b) rewarding vs. aversive visual stimuli, and, (c) participants’ decisions during the 
decision phase of the task.  Additional whole-brain analysis included examination of 
variations in BOLD via stimuli valence (i.e., reward – aversive) contrasts and a 2 (Stress 
Group: Stress vs. No Stress) x 2 (Stimuli Valence: Reward vs. Aversive) mixed-design 
ANOVA for the learning phases.  Similarly, BOLD variations derived from the decision 
phases were examined via decision quality (i.e., good – bad) contrasts and a 2 (Stress 
Group: Stress vs. No Stress) x 2 (Decision Quality: Good vs. Bad) mixed-design 
ANOVA.  Beta weights from activation clusters that survived either method of correction 
stated above were extracted and post-hoc analyses were performed along the lines of 
stress group and reversal phase (i.e., pre- vs. post-reversal) in the case of simple contrasts 
and only along the lines of reversal phase for the mixed-design ANOVA. Given the 
absence of a behavioral baseline task and the nature of the aforementioned z-
normalization procedures, the fMRI "baseline" around which all data are presented 
represents a whole-brain (i.e., global) z-score of 0. 
 
RESULTS 
Subjective Ratings of Stress 
 Post-experimental subjective ratings of perceived stress were examined between 
the acute stress and control groups via independent t-tests.  These included ratings of how 
the SECPT procedure made participants feel (good to bad) and how stressful their 
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experience was (not at all to very much).  Relative to the control group, the stress group 
rated their experience during the procedure as being a significantly worse, t(26) = 4.38, p 
< .001, d = 1.66 and more stressful, t(18) = -6.66, p < .001, d = -2.52 (see Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. Participants in the acute stress group reported higher levels of subjective stress 
compared to the control group; * p < .05. 
 
Psychophysiological Measures 
 Hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis (HPA) Measures.  Salivary data were 
excluded from one participant due to insufficient saliva collection during MRI.  Thus, 
cortisol analyses were conducted on 27 of the 28 participants (13 control and 14 acute 
stress).  Mean salivary cortisol levels for all four samples are displayed in Table 2.  The 
results of a 4 (Sample 1, 2, 3, or 4) × 2 (Experimental Group: Control vs. Stress) repeated 
measures ANOVA revealed a significant interaction, F(3, 23) = 3.37, p < .05, ηp2 = 0.32 
(see Figure 4).  In order to examine the effects of the interaction, post-hoc independent 
samples t-tests were conducted between groups for each sample.  Results demonstrated 
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significantly higher levels of cortisol for the stress group for each sample, including 
baseline.  These baseline differences are likely an effect of having a small sample.  
Importantly, post-hoc paired samples t-tests revealed a significant increase from Sample 
1 (Baseline) to Sample 2 (~30 minutes post-stress) for the stress group only, t(13) =         
-2.85, p < .05, d = -.75. 
 
 
Figure 4. Mean cortisol concentration (nmol/L) for the acute stress and control groups 
across four time points. Only the acute stress demonstrated a significant cortisol response 
15-20 minutes post SECPT or control. 
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Table 2 
Mean Salivary Cortisol Measurements 
 
Sample (nmol/L) Experimental Group 
 Acute Stress Control 
Baseline 5.31 ± 0.77 3.35 ± 0.36 
~30 Min Post-Stress 8.05 ± 1.23 3.00 ± 0.44 
Pre-Reversal 5.45 ± 0.86 3.20 ± 0.40 
Post-Reversal 4.50 ± 0.32 3.38 ± 0.44 
Note. Mean salivary cortisol and standard error of the mean (SEM). 
 
 Sympathetic-adrenal medullary (SAM) axis Measures.  Mean HR measures 
during each phase of the acute stress procedure are displayed in Table 3.  To examine 
SAM activation during the stress procedure, a 3 (Phase) × 2 (Experimental Group: 
Control vs. Stress) was conducted.  Results revealed a significant interaction F(2, 52) = 
8.34, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.24 (see Figure 5).  Post-hoc comparisons demonstrated a 
significant increase in HR for the acute stress group only, t(13) = -2.42, p < .05, d = -
0.46, followed by a significant reduction after the removal of the stressor, t(13) = 2.94, p 
< .05, d = 0.57.   
 Systolic blood pressure (SBP) and diastolic blood pressure (DBP) were also 
collected during each phase of the stress procedure as additional markers of SAM 
activation.  Blood pressure data were excluded from ten participants due to technical 
error, thus the following analyses were carried out on from 18 (9 Acute Stress and 9 
Control) participants.  A 3 (Phase) × 2 (Experimental Group: Control vs. Stress) ANOVA 
was conducted for both blood pressure measures.  This resulted in significant phase by 
stress interactions for both SBP and DBP F(2, 32) = 17.77, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.53, and F(2, 
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32) = 21.29, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.57, respectively.  Post-hoc comparisons between groups 
during stress manipulation revealed significantly higher SBP and DBP in acute stress 
group [SBP: t(16) = -5.25, p < .001, d = -3.26; DBP:, t(16) = -5.71, p < .001, d = -2.69]. 
Mean SC levels during each phase of the acute stress procedure are displayed in 
Table 3.  A third 3 (Phase) × 2 (Experimental Group: Control vs. Stress) ANOVA was 
conducted to assess SC response, yet another marker of sympathetic activation.  Results 
demonstrated a significant interaction effect, F(2, 52) = 14.99, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.37 (see 
Figure 5).  Follow-up independent t-tests demonstrated significantly higher SC levels for 
participants in the acute stress group t(26) = -2.4, p = < .05, d = .91.   
 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean HR and SCL for each experimental group capturing response to SECPT 
or control procedure. Only the acute stress group demonstrated a significant increase in 
HR and SC response to the experimental manipulation.  
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Table 3 
 
Mean Sympathetic Measurements During Acute Stress Procedure  
 
  Experimental Group 
 Acute Stress Control 
 HR SC HR SC 
Baseline 76.08 ± 2.5 5.41 ± 0.9 78.47 ± 3.1 5.2 ± 0.84 
Stress 82.18 ± 4.36 8.87 ± 0.96 75.41 ± 3.39 5.59 ± 0.96 
Post Stress 74.17 ± 2.96 7.21 ± 0.92 77.02 ± 3.29 5.35 ± 0.87 
Note. Heart rate (HR; bpm) and skin conductance (SC; μS) were collected in 3-minute 
bins. 
 
Behavioral Data 
 Days 1-3 reaction time (learning trials).  A 3 (Day) × 8 (EV) repeated measures 
ANOVA revealed a significant interaction F(14, 378) = 1.80, p < .05, ηp2 = 0.06.  In order 
to simplify interpretation, a follow-up 3 (Day) × 2(EV) ANOVA was conducted in which 
only the most positive (EV = 3) and most negative (EV = -3) stimuli were assessed.  Due 
to their association with the most extreme EVs, these stimuli were likely most salient 
during learning.  Results from the follow-up ANOVA also demonstrated a significant 
interaction, F(2, 54) = 4.36, p < .05, ηp2 = 0.14.  This interaction was characterized by a 
decrease in RT for the most positive stimulus from day 1 to day 3, t(27) = 2.86, p < .01, d 
= .59, but no change in RT for the most negative stimulus. 
Days 1-3 decision quality (decision trials).  Data regarding decision quality were 
examined by identifying trials in which the subject chose the square that was most 
advantageous (or less disadvantageous) during the decision trials.  Once the data were 
corrected for null trials, the number of good to bad trials were exactly proportional, thus 
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analyses here were performed on good choices only.  The percentage of good decisions 
was measured for each of the three training days using repeated measures ANOVA (see 
Figure 6).  Results indicated a significant main effect of Day, F(1.40, 37.83) = 24.21, p < 
.001, ηp2 = 0.47.  Post-hoc t-tests revealed a significant increase in correct responses from 
Day 1 (M= 66.27%, SD = 12.22%) to Day 2 [M =76.30%, SD = 11.13%; t(27) = -4.62, p 
< .001, d = -.86.  Notably, decision quality reached asymptote on Day 2 with non-
significant improvement on Day 3 (M= 78.1%, SD = 10.29%). 
 
           
 
Figure 6. Proportion of good decisions across the first three days of instrumental 
conditioning, combined across groups; * p < .05. 
 
Scan day reaction time (learning trials).  A 2 (Reversal Phase) X 8 (EV) X 2 
(Stress Condition) mixed design ANOVA revealed a main effect of EV, F(7, 182) = 2.09, 
p < .05 that failed to maintain significance after accounting for a violation of sphericity.  
No other within or between group findings were observed.    
Scan day decision quality (decision trials).  When examining decision quality, 
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the control group mean).  Additionally, this particular participant reported difficulty 
staying awake during this portion of the task.  Importantly, removal of this individual did 
not alter the significance of the results below.  Thus, this subject’s average post-reversal 
bad decision score was windzorized. 
The proportion of good decisions from the two pre-reversal trials was averaged 
separately from the post-reversal trials to compose a pre- and post-reversal decision 
quality score.  In order to examine the effect of acute stress on habitual decisions, a 2 
(Bad decisions for Pre- vs. Post-Reversal) × 2(Acute Stress vs. No Stress) mixed 
ANOVA was conducted (see Figure 7).  Results demonstrated a significant main effect of 
Reversal F(1, 26) = 10.06, p < .005, ηp2 = 0.28, as well as significant reversal-stress group 
interaction F(1, 26) = 6.88, p < .05, ηp2 = 0.21.  Post-hoc paired samples t-tests were used 
to examine significant changes in bad decisions from pre- to post-reversal within each 
experimental group.  Results indicated a significant increase in Bad decisions for the 
stress group only [pre-reversal bad decisions: M =16.51, SD = 6.62; post-reversal bad 
decisions: M =24.50, SD = 10.22; t(13) = -4.1, p < .005 d = -.93]. No significant between 
group differences for bad decisions post reversal were observed, t(26,) = -1.20, p = .24.  
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Figure 7.  Proportions of “Bad” decisions for overlearn stimuli (regular trials) and after 
probabilistic stimuli associations were reversed (reversal trials) for acute stress and 
control group. Stress group participants made decisions more “in line” with the original 
overtrained (i.e., habitual) values post-reversal; * p < .05. 
 
fMRI Results  
Stimuli valance (Learning): positive EV – negative EV contrast.  Functional 
ROIs were generated by applying a positive EV – negative EV contrast for all learning 
trials [(Pre-Reversal Positive EV + Post-Reversal Positive EV) - (Pre-Reversal Negative 
EV + Post-Reversal Negative EV)].  This whole-brain contrast yielded significant 
activation in the right putamen and a relatively large activation cluster in the left putamen 
(slightly displaced) that extended into the claustrum and anterior insula.  Parameter 
estimates were extracted from the whole ROI in the right putamen, but limited to 8 cubic 
mm3 around the peak voxel of left putamen ROI.  In this case, limiting extraction around 
the peak voxel allowed the researcher to minimize the contribution of the claustrum and 
to exclude the anterior insula from post-hoc analyses (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8. A) Activated ROIs for positive EV – negative EV contrast during learning 
trials. B and C) Post-hoc examination of ROIS along the lines of stress group and reversal 
phase; differential activation between positive and negative stimuli was maintained in the 
putamen for the pre-reversal trials in both acute stress and control groups; * p < .05;       	
† p = .05. 
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In order to examine differences in putamen activation between over-trained and 
novel stimuli, parameter estimates for pre- and post-reversal were compared within and 
between experimental groups.  In the right putamen, differential activation for positively 
and negatively valenced stimuli was significant for the pre-reversal stimuli only.  This 
significant differential activation was observed for both the control, t(12) = 3.96, p < 
.005, d = .90 and acute stress group, t(13) = 2.22, p < .05, d = .34.  In the left putamen, 
the same significant differential activation was also observed for the pre-reversal stimuli 
in the control group, t(12) = 3.82, p < .005, d = .69, and trended in the same direction for 
the acute stress group, t(13) = 2.11, p = .05, d = .56.  Unlike the results from right 
putamen, the differential activation between positively and negatively valenced stimuli in 
the left putamen was significant for novel stimuli during the reversal trials, but only for 
the control group, t(12) = 2.85, p < .05, d = .43.  Post-hoc t-tests comparing activation in 
both right and left putamen did not reveal significant differential BOLD responses within 
the stress group.   
Stimuli valance (Learning): positive EV – negative EV by experimental 
group contrast.  To examine differences in differential responses to positively versus 
negatively valenced stimuli between stress groups, a contrast of positive EV – negative 
EV was computed along the between-subjects factor of stress group [(No Stress Positive 
EV – No Stress Negative EV) - [(Stress Positive EV – Stress Negative EV)].  This 
contrast yielded significant clusters in right frontopolar prefrontal cortex (FPFC) and left 
putamen, as well as broad activation of thalamus (see Figure 9). 
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Figure 9. A) Activated ROIs for positive EV – negative EV by experimental group 
contrast. B and C) Post-hoc examination of ROIS along the lines of stress group and 
reversal phase; differential responding for positive and negative stimuli during pre- and 
post-reversal was achieved in the left putamen and FPPFC for the control group only; * p 
< .05. 
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To further examine the nature of this interaction, parameter estimates for positive 
and negative stimuli were divided along the lines of pre- and post-reversal trials within 
each experimental group.  In the control group, the right FPFC exhibited significant 
differential activation for positive and negative stimuli during pre- and post-reversal 
learning, t(12) = 4.49, p < .01, d = .63 and t(12) = 2.33, p < .05, d = .40, respectively.  In 
the acute stress group, however, significant differential activation between stimuli 
valence was not observed during either pre- or post-reversal condition, t(13) = -.68, p = 
.51 and t(13) = -1.72, p = .12, respectively.  A similar pattern of activation was detected 
in the left putamen cluster.  That is, significant differential activation between stimuli 
valence during both pre- and post-reversal was observed in the control group, t(12) = 
6.02, p < .001, d = 1.02 and t(12) = 2.35, p < .05, d = .46, respectively, but not the acute 
stress group, t(12) = -.47 p = .65 and t(12) = -1.23, p = .23, respectively.  No significant 
between group differences were observed in either the FPFC or putamen.   
Stimuli valance (Learning): positive EV – negative EV by experimental 
group contrast (Pre-Reversal Only).  Next, a positive EV – negative EV contrast for 
pre-reversal trials only was computed along the between-subjects factor of stress group 
[(No Stress Pre-Reversal Positive EV – No Stress Pre-Reversal Negative EV) - [(Stress 
Pre-Reversal Positive EV – Stress Pre-Reversal Negative EV)].  This was limited to pre-
reversal trials only.  An independent examination of pre-reversal activation provides a 
more robust analysis of functional activation associated with overtrained stimulus-
response associations.  This contrast yielded activation clusters in right PFC (2mm 
displaced), left mPFC and left caudate (see Figure 10).   
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Figure 10. Activated ROIs during the pre-reversal learning trials only based on a positive 
EV – negative EV by experimental group contrast and associated post-hoc analyses along 
the lines of stress group. The same ROIs were also applied to the post-reversal learning 
trials for both experimental groups. Regions associated with goal-directed behaviors 
displayed differential activation for positively and negatively valenced stimuli, but only 
in the control group. Only mPFC maintained differential activation during the reversal 
trials; * p < .05. 
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In the left mPFC, the differential activation between positively and negatively 
valenced stimuli was significant in the control group only, t(12) = 5.04, p < .001, d = .69. 
Interestingly, higher levels of activation corresponding to negatively valenced stimuli 
were observed for the control group, while lower BOLD levels were observed for the 
acute stress group.  This difference trended toward significance, t(25) = -1.89, p = .07.   
In the control group only, significant differential activation between positively 
and negatively valenced stimuli was also observed in the left caudate; t(12) = 5.85, p < 
.001, d = .89 and right PFC, t(12) = 6.07, p < .001, d = .60.  There were no significant 
between group differences in either the caudate or PFC. When these three ROIs (mPFC, 
left caudate, and right PFC) were applied to the reversal-learning data, only the mPFC for 
the control group demonstrated continued differential responding, t(13) = -2.24, p < .05, 
d = -.31.  
Stimuli valance (Learning): positive EV – negative EV by experimental 
group contrast (Post-Reversal Only).  When computing the positive EV – negative EV 
contrast along the between-subjects factor of stress group [(No Stress Post-Reversal 
Positive EV – No Stress Post-Reversal Negative EV) - [(Stress Post-Reversal Positive 
EV – Stress Post-Reversal Negative EV)], a single activation cluster was observed near 
the posterior portion of the superior frontal gyrus, a portion of the supplementary motor 
area (SMA).   
First, to directly assess the specific nature of this significant interaction cluster 
paired samples t-tests were conducted between positively and negatively valenced stimuli 
in both the control and acute stress group.  Results demonstrated significantly greater 
activation for negatively valenced, compared to positively valenced stimuli in the acute 
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stress group, t(13) = -4.91, p < .001, d = -.73, but not the control group, t(12) = 1.48, p = 
.17.  This was the only analysis that yielded significant differential activation between 
positively and negatively valenced stimuli in the stress group during post-reversal 
learning.  Between-group differences for activation associated with either positive or 
negative stimuli were not observed. Interestingly, when applying this ROI to pre-reversal 
learning trials, the differential activation was observed in the control group only, t(12) = 
2.28, p < .05, d = .60.   
For a review of functional ROIs associated with differential BOLD activation for 
positive versus negatively valenced stimuli, refer to Table 4. 
 
Table 4 
 
ROIs Indicating Significant Differential Activation Between Positively and 
Negatively Valenced Stimuli During Learning 
 
 Pre-Reversal Post-Reversal 
Contrast Control Stress Control Stress 
1 
R Putamen R Putamen L Putamen - 
L Putamen L Putamen   
2 FPFC - FPFC - 
3 
mPFC mPFC   
L Caudate - - - 
R PFC    
4 SMA - - SMA 
Note: Contrast 1: Positive EV – Negative EV; Contrast 2:Positive EV – Negative EV X 
Experimental Group; Contrast 3: Positive EV – Negative EV (pre-reversal only) X 
Experimental Group; Contrast 4: Positive EV – Negative EV (post-reversal only) X 
Experimental Group 
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Decision quality: Composite Good Choice  – Bad Choice.  In order to assess 
neural function during the decision phase, a simple good choice – bad choice contrast 
was applied to the whole brain [(Pre-Reversal Good Decision + Post-Reversal Good 
Decisions) - (Pre-Reversal Bad Decisions + Post-Reversal Bad Decisions)].  To increase 
power, good choices from both pre- and post-reversal trials were averaged together, as 
were bad choices.  This contrast yielded significant activation in the left and right anterior 
insular cortex, as well as the dorsomedial anterior cingulate cortex.  Beta values were 
extracted from these three regions and post-hoc analyses performed.  In both the left and 
right anterior insular cortex, greater activation was observed in the context of bad 
decisions compared to good decisions.  In the left anterior insula of the control group, this 
difference was observed in both the pre- and post-reversal decision phase, t(12) = 3.87, p 
< .01, d = .90 and t(12) = 3.28, p < .01, d = .77; respectively.   
Likewise, the same differences were also observed in the acute stress group for 
both the pre- and post-reversal decision phases, t(13) = 4.84, p < .001, d = .90 and t(13) = 
3.01, p < .05, d = .54; respectively.  Similar findings were observed in the right anterior 
insular cortex.  While there were no between experimental group differences, there was a 
significant reduction in overall insular activation from pre- to post-reversal decision, 
regardless of decision quality, in the stress group only.  This difference was observed in 
both the left and right insula, t(13) = 2.83, p < .01, d = .90 and t(13) = 3.01, p < .01, d = 
.81; respectively.  In the ACC, greater activation was associated with bad decisions 
compared to good decisions.  There was no effect of decision phase or stress group.  
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Decision quality: Composite Good Choice  – Bad Choice by experimental 
group contrast. 
 
 Next, a Good Decision – Bad Decision contrast for pre-reversal trials only was 
computed along the between-subjects factor of stress group [(No Stress Good Decision – 
No Stress Bad Decision) - [(Stress Good Decision – Stress Bad Decision)].  This contrast 
yielded significant activation clusters in the right entorhinal cortex (EC) and left 
dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC; see Figure 11). 
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  A.      B. 
 
 
Figure 11. A) Activated ROIs associated with Good Choice  – Bad Choice by 
experimental group contrast; decisions quality was collapse across reversal phase. B) 
Post-hoc analysis of extracted parameter estimates along the lines of stress group and 
reversal phase. Individuals in the acute stress group displayed decreased responding in 
right EC and left DLPFC relative to the control group. Differential responding was 
achieved both pre- and post-reversal in the control group only; * p < .05. 
 
To further examine the nature of this interaction, parameter estimates for good 
and bad decisions were divided along the lines of pre- and post-reversal trials.  In the 
control group, the right EC exhibited significantly less activation for good decisions 
compared to bad decisions during pre- and post-reversal learning, t(12) = -2.25, p < .05, d 
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= -.51 and t(12) = -2.87, p < .05, d = -.57, respectively].  In the acute stress group, 
differential activation was characterized by significantly less activation for bad decisions 
during the pre-reversal decision task, t(12) = -4.73, p < .001, d = .40 and a similar non-
significant pattern of responding post-reversal, t(12) = -1.28, p = .22. Between group 
analyses demonstrated significantly greater activation of the EC in the control group 
during pre-reversal decisions, t(25) = 2.11, p < .05, d = .82. A similar post-reversal 
finding trended in the same direction, t(25) = 1.34, p = .19. 
In the left prefrontal cortex, parameter estimates for good and bad decisions were 
divided along the lines of pre- and post-reversal as above. During the pre-reversal 
decisions, post-hoc analyses revealed higher BOLD activation for bad decision in the 
control group, t(12) = 2.78, p < .05, d = .44 and lower BOLD activation for bad decisions 
in the acute stress group, t(13) = -4.24, p < .005, d = -.58. During the post-reversal 
decisions, the control also exhibited higher levels activation for bad decisions that 
trended toward significance, t(12) = 1.50, p = .16, while no differential activation was 
observed in the acute stress group. Interestingly, when averaging across decision quality 
the DLPFC activation was significantly higher in the control group compared to the acute 
stress group, t(25) = 2.26, p < .05, d = .88. No between group differences were observed 
for pre-reversal decisions. See Table 7 for a full listing of all activated ROI clusters for 
each contrast reported above. 
Neuropsychological Results 
In order to examine the impact of baseline neuropsychological functioning, Day 1 
scores on 5 tests (i.e., Trails B, SDMT, Digit Span, Stroop, and CPT Commissions) 
measuring various aspects of executive functioning (e.g., working memory, attention, 
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processing speed, and impulsivity) were selected for analysis (See Table 5 for means and 
standard deviations of raw and standardized scores).  These measures were selected based 
on their theoretical relation to executive functioning and a suitable amount of common 
variance (coefficients of .3 and above) necessary to conduct the planned factor analysis.  
In assessing the factorability of the above measures, the Kaiser Meyer-Olkin value was 
.59, approaching the recommended value of .6 (Kaiser 1970, 1974) and Bartlett’s Test of 
Sphericity (Bartlett 1954) reached statistical significance. Together, these findings 
broadly support the factorability of the correlation matrix.  
 
Table 5 
 
Description of Raw and Standardized Neuropsychological Test Scores 
 
Test n Raw Standardized 
  Mean SD Mean SD 
Trails B 28 53.29 sec. 15.93 sec. 102.64 12.12 
SDMT 28 54.82 ct. 8.96 ct. 90.54 12.58 
WAIS IV-Digit Span Total 28 29.89 5.03 103.21 13.42 
Computerized Stroop* 27 93.81 3.8 Z 0 Z 1 
CPT Commissions^ 28 T 49.25 T 7.84 98.92 11.66 
Note: *Raw score represents percent correct during incongruent trials. These scores were 
then z-transformed. All other scores were standardized using Heaton (Trails B and 
SDMT) or manualized normative data. ^T-scores generated by Conners’s CPT 3 
computer scoring program are listed in lieu of raw scores. 
 
Principal component analysis (PCA) revealed two components with eigenvalues 
exceeding 1, explaining 43.04% and 27.13% of the variance, respectively.  To aid in the 
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interpretation of the two components, oblimin rotation was performed.  The rotated 
solution revealed the presence of a simple structure (Thurston 1947), with both 
components showing strong loadings and each variable loading substantially to only one 
component.  The interpretation of the first component, which is made up of Digit Span, 
Trails B, and Symbol Digit, relates to a global working memory/attention construct.  The 
second component, containing CPT Commissions and Stroop, is can be interpreted as a 
measure of impulsivity.   
To further examine the appropriateness of this 2 factor solution, the initial 
eigenvalues were compared to eigenvalues generated from random data using the parallel 
analysis technique originally developed by Horn (1965).  Specifically, 1000 random data 
sets containing the same number of cases (n = 28) and variable (5) were generated 
according to the constraints of O’connor (2000) in order to compute a series of random 
eigenvalues.  While the initial researchers who developed this approach compared the 
actual eigenvalues to the mean values derived from the random data (Horn, 1965), 
currently it is more common to compare obtained eigenvalues to the 95th percentile of 
random eigenvalues (Glorfeld, 1995 as cited in Hoelzle & Meyer, 2013), limiting the 
likelihood of over extraction.  Both the obtained and randomly generated (i.e., mean and 
95th percentile) eigenvalues are displayed in Figure 12.  The obtained eigenvalue of the 
first factor (2.11) was greater than both the mean and 95th percentile of randomly 
generated eigenvalue (1.57 and 1.82, respectively).  The obtained eigenvalue of the 
second factor (1.36) was greater than the randomly generated mean eigenvalue (1.21) but 
fell short of the randomly generated 95th percentile eigenvalue (1.39).  Nevertheless, the 
obtained eigenvalue of 1.36 is greater than 1.3 standard deviations above the randomly 
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generated mean, which when combined with theoretical understanding for the proposed 
two-factor solution, extraction of the second factor is not unwarranted.   
 
 
 
Figure 12. Original eigenvalues for Day 1 scores on 5 tests (i.e., Trails B, Coding, Digit 
Span, Stroop, and CPT Omissions) measuring various aspects of executive functioning 
(e.g., working memory, attention, and processing speed) plotted against randomly 
generated eigenvalue means and 95th percentile.  
 
Next, correlations between the two resulting factor scores and the post-reversal 
bad decisions were computed for the stress group only.  Neither the attention/working 
memory component, nor the impulsivity component significantly correlated with post-
reversal bad decisions, [r (12) = -.425, p = .15 and r (12) = -.01, p = .97, respectively].  
Because neither factor was significantly correlated with the dependent variable, the 
planned regression analysis was not performed.  Instead, a simple set of correlations was 
conducted to examine the potential for relationship between the primary dependent 
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provide a “clean” measure of the tested construct, independent from factors of sex, 
ethnicity, and age.  The results from these correlations are listed in Table 6.  Notably, 
only Trails B scores were significantly correlated with post-reversal bad decisions in the 
stress group (n = 14, r = .68, p < .01). 
 
Table 6 
 
Correlations Between Five Cognitive Variables and Habitual Decisions Post Stress 
 
Measures  1 2 3 4 5 
1.  Trails B  -         
2.  Stroop 0.2  - 
   3.  Symbol Digit -0.42 0.15  - 
  4. Digit Span  -.78* -0.25 0.44  -  
 5.  Conner's Commissions -0.34 0.32 0.23 -0.02  -  
6.  Habitual Decisions   .68*  -.11 -0.31 -0.42 -.52^ 
Note.  These data reflect correlations obtained in the acute stress group only (n = 14) *p < 
.01, ^p = .06. 
  
Trials B  
 Days 1-3.  In order to better understand the relationship between individual 
differences in executive function and habit-based decision-making under stress, Trails B 
scores were assessed in relation to learning on days 1-3 as well as during fMRI scanning.  
A median split was performed on raw Trails B to divide the sample into a high cognitive 
flexibility group (H-CogFlex; n  = 14, M =41.79, SD = 6.08) and a low cognitive 
flexibility group (L-CogFlex; n  = 14, M =64.79, SD = 14.32), based on their raw score 
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in seconds.  Compared to the L-CogFlex group, the H-CogFlex had significantly more 
correct responses on Days 2 and 3, t(26) = 2.43, p < .05, d = .86 and t(26) = 2.50, p < .05, 
d = .84 , respectively, demonstrating improved learning and better task acquisition (see 
Figure 13).   
 
 
 
Figure 13. Learning as measured by proportion of “Good” decisions during the first three 
days of instrumental conditioning examined as a function of cognitive flexibility; * p < 
.05. 
 
Decision quality during imaging.  Using the three ROIs generated from group 
level (n = 27), whole brain good – bad contrast (i.e., bilateral anterior insula and right 
dorsomedial anterior cingulate cortex), additional post-hoc analyses were conducted 
along the lines of cognitive flexibility established by the aforementioned median split.  
The purpose of this analysis was to assess the impact of cognitive flexibility on decision 
quality in both the acute stress and control group (i.e., to examine the third and final aim 
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of this project).  Within the stress group, the right dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 
demonstrated differential activation between good and bad decisions that reached 
significance during both pre-reversal, t(7) = 4.32, p < .005 d = 1.55 and to a lessor extent 
post-reversal decision trials, t(7) = 2.60, p < .05, d = .43, in the H-CogFlex group only.  
In the L-CogFlex group, the level of differential activation was not significant during pre- 
or post-reversal decisions. Separate examination of H-CogFlex and L-CogFlex groups 
within the control condition yielded a different pattern of results. That is, the level of 
differential activation between good and bad decisions was significant or trending for 
both pre- and post-reversal trials regardless of cognitive flexibility [H-CogFlex: pre-
reversal, t(4) = 3.06, p < .05, d = .99; post-reversal, t(4) = 2.78, p = .05, d = 1.02 and L-
CogFlex: pre-reversal, t(7) = 3.67, p < .01, d = .90; post-reversal, t(7) = 2.34, p = .05, d = 
.67]. 
 Similar findings were observed in the bi-lateral insula. That is, in the left anterior 
insula of the stress group, significant differential activation between good and bad 
decisions was observed during both pre-reversal, t(7) = 3.38 p < .05, d = .88 and post-
reversal, t(7) = 3.19 p < .05, d = .77  phases in the H-CogFlex group only.  In the L-
CogFlex group, significant differential activation was observed only in the pre-reversal 
phase, t(5) = 3.71 p < .05, d = 1.04. This pattern was not observed in the control group, as 
differential activation was significant or trending independent of cognitive flexibility  [H-
CogFlex: pre-reversal, t(4) = 2.73, p = .05, d = .94; post-reversal, t(4) = 2.13, p = .10, d = 
.85 and L-CogFlex: pre-reversal, t(7) = 2.88, p < .05, d = .86; post-reversal, t(7) = 2.51, p 
< .05, d = .64]. 
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 Finally, the same pattern of activation was also observed in right anterior insula.  
That is, after exposure to acute stress, the H-CogFlex group demonstrated differential 
activation between good and bad decisions that reached significance during both pre- and 
post-reversal trials, t(7) = 5.06 p < .005, d = 1.17 and t(7) = 2.75 p < .05 d = .53, 
respectively.  In the L-CogFlex group, significant differential activation was observed in 
the pre-reversal phase, t(5) = 2.59 p < .05, d = 0.54, but failed to reach significance post-
reversal (See Figure 14 for a summary of these findings).  The potential implications of 
these findings, with respect to flexibility and decision-making are discussed below.  
Consistent with previous findings in the ACC and insula, this pattern was not observed in 
the control group. Irrespective of cognitive flexibility, differential activation was 
observed for pre-reversal decisions, but not post-reversal [H-CogFlex: pre-reversal, t(4) = 
3.10, p < .05, d = .87; post-reversal, t(4) = 2.13, p = .17 and L-CogFlex: pre-reversal, t(7) 
= 2.84, p < .05, d = .85; post-reversal, t(7) = .98, p = .36]. 
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Figure 14. ROIs obtained from Good Choice  – Bad Choice for the whole sample (n = 
28). Graphs display differential activation for good and bad decisions as a function of 
cognitive flexibility and along the lines of reversal phase in the stress group only (n = 
14). Individuals with higher baseline cognitive flexibility demonstrated greater activation 
for bad decisions during both pre- and post-reversal decisions; * p < .05.
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Table 7 
 
Brain Regions Demonstrating Significant Activation For Each Experimental Contrast (p < 
0.005, corrected). 
 
Activated Region Laterality  Talairach Coordinates 
Voxel 
Count 
(mm3) T-value 
  
x y z   
Learning: positive EV – negative EV contrast         
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 6)*  L -24 21 58 830 4.37 
Putamen (dorsal striatum) R 27 2 10 1431 4.59 
Putamen (dorsal striatum)*  L -30 5 7 1811 4.67 
Anterior Cerebellum L -3 -55 -20 1000 4.37 
Learning: positive EV – negative EV by experimental group contrast    
Prefrontal cortex (BA 10)*  R 12 68 -5 962 5.03 
Putamen (dorsal striatum) L -21 -1 10 675 4.73 
Thalamus R/L -15 -13 7 6370 5.22 
Anterior Cerebellum R 9 -34 -14 598 4.69 
Posterior Cerebellum L 0 -70 -20 3247 4.82 
Posterior Cerebellum R 21 -73 -26 4772 4.91 
Learning: positive EV – negative EV by experimental group contrast 
(Pre-Reversal Only)   
Prefrontal cortex (BA 11)* R 9 68 -11 905 4.67 
Medial prefrontal cortex (BA 11) L -15 65 -11 639 4.31 
Caudate L -9 11 7 473 4.19 
Thalamus R -6 -19 7 634 4.20 
Anterior Cerebellum R 12 -64 -23 744 4.21 
Learning: positive EV – negative EV by experimental group contrast 
(Post-Reversal Only)   
Supplemental motor area (BA 6)* R 6 11 55 966 4.44 
Posterior Cerebellum L -39 -70 -39 4129 5.05 
Posterior Cerebellum R 36 -64 -29 1151 4.72 
Decision quality: Composite Good Choice  – Bad Choice^      
Anterior insula (BA 13) R 33 23 4 699 -6.03 
Inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47)	† L -34 26 1 929 -6.06 
Anterior cingulate cortex (BA 32)		 R 7 23 37 528 -6.00 
Lingual Gyrus (BA 18)* L -15 -67 4 6 -4.82 
Decision quality: Composite Good Choice  – Bad Choice by experimental 
group contrast   
Entorhinal Cortex (BA 28) R 21 2 -29 929 -5.62 
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 6) L -24 14 52 605 -4.42 
Note. * </= 3 mm displacement; ^ multiple comparisons corrected for by false discovery rate 
(FDR); †	activation	extends	primarily	into	left	anterior	insula.
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DISCUSSION 
 The goal of the current study was to assess the impact of stress on the neural 
correlates of instrumentally conditioned stimulus-response associations and the ability to 
flexibly acquire and make-decisions based on novel action-outcome contingencies using 
monetary gains and losses.  Specifically, participants learned to discriminate between 
visual stimuli that were probabilistically associated with gains or losses for three days.  
Decision quality for the entire sample significantly improved over the course of training 
reaching asymptote on day two.  On the fourth day, participants were exposed to an acute 
laboratory stressor (or control condition) prior to completing instrumental conditioning 
and decision tasks during fMRI scanning.  The efficacy of the stress procedure was 
confirmed through multiple objective measures including increases in salivary cortisol, 
HR, blood pressure, and SCL as well as subjective measure of perceived stress. 
 The functional task incorporated two broad components.  First, participants 
completed a set of learning and decision trials identical to trials on days 1-3.  Second, the 
contingencies associated with the stimuli were reversed such that stimuli originally 
associated with wins more often than losses were now associated more with losses rather 
than wins.  After reversal, participants engaged in a novel acquisition phase in order to 
learn the new values associated with each stimulus, followed by a set of decision trials.  
Importantly, just as in the original decision trials, feedback was not provided.   
Consistent with Hypothesis 1 of Aim 1, exposure to acute stress increased the 
frequency of habit-based decisions during the reversal trials.  That is, participants who 
were exposed to acute stress made more decisions in line with the overtrained stimuli 
even after those stimuli were rendered financially detrimental.  While the increase in 
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habitual responding was significant for the stress group, it is important to recognize that 
both groups were able acquire the new stimuli contingencies.  For example, even the 
acute stress group was able to manage advantageous responding (i.e., goal-directed 
behavior) for 75.5% of the reversal trials (compared to 80.2% in the control group).  This 
suggests that exposure to acute stress did not completely interfere with acquisition during 
the novel learning trials, nor did it fully inhibit goal-directed behavior during the novel 
decision trials.  Further demonstrating some degree of learning, the proportion of “good” 
decisions for the reversed stimuli was significantly greater than the proportion of “good” 
decisions made on day 1, with no differences between groups.  The fact that some 
learning continued to take place after stress exposure will be important when discussing 
the imaging data below. 
Several studies have demonstrated similar findings in animal and human models 
(Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009; Schwabe & Wolf, 2009, 2010).  Specifically, these studies 
trained subjects to perform two instrumental responses, associated with specific stimuli, 
in order to gain two separate food rewards.  After sufficient training, one of the two food 
rewards was devalued through selective satiety.  Testing during extinction showed that 
when stress preceded instrumental conditioning, subjects responded equally to the stimuli 
associated with both the devalued and the non-devalued food reward.  That is, stress 
facilitated habitual behavior by decreasing subjects’ sensitivity to the changes in the 
value of food outcomes.  While stress effects have been observed in the context of 
Pavlovian conditioning (Lewis, Porcelli, & Delgado, 2014), to the researchers knowledge 
this is the first study to utilize monetary gains and losses to assess stress induced habitual 
behavior in this way.  Thus, this is a potentially important addition to the literature for 
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several reasons.  First, the ability to assess habits using a financial decision-making task, 
rather than food devaluation, allows for more flexible design creation.  Second, the use of 
monetary rewards arguably has greater ecological validity for assessing decision-making 
in a broad sense.  That is, many everyday decisions are likely to involve secondary 
reinforcers as compared to primary reinforcers such as food and the feeling of satiety 
typically associated with food devaluation studies.   
At the neural level, several lines of inquiry were pursued.  First, several contrast-
based analyses were performed involving examination of differential BOLD responses to 
positive and negative stimuli during the learning phases.  These contrasts yielded clusters 
in multiple striatal and prefrontal areas.  Importantly, activation during exposure to the 
overtrained (i.e., pre-reversal) stimuli consisted of both medial and lateral dorsal striatum, 
mPFC, and FPFC.  The caudate and prefrontal regions, which are thought to be 
associated with goal directed behavior, were activated during the original learning phases 
despite overtraining.  This suggests that both the goal-directed and habit-based systems 
can indeed be concurrently activated and competing for behavioral control as described 
by Kahneman and Frederick (2002).  Additionally, in a 3-day imaging study assessing 
neural changes associated with habit formation, Tricomi et al. (2009) observed sustained 
activation of medial PFC, despite clear dorsolateral striatum activation that gradually 
increased overtime and was linked to S-R associations.  Further, when the habit system is 
disrupted (as in animal lesion studies) goal-oriented behavior resumes. This suggests that 
goal-directed neural systems remain operational despite overlearning (Yin & Knowlton, 
2006). 
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The idea that both habit and goal-directed systems can be concurrently activated 
is also demonstrated by bilateral putamen and FPFC activation during the novel 
acquisition phase (post-reversal).  While no specific hypothesis was proposed regarding 
changes in brain activation during the “learning” of overtrained associations and the 
acquisition of novel associations, it is notable that the putamen but not the caudate 
remained engaged during novel stimuli contingency acquisition (i.e., post-reversal).  This 
is likely a consequence of the experimental design itself.  Stimuli presented during the 
reversal phase were identical to the overtrained stimuli with the exception of the 
contingencies probabilistically associated with each.  Therefore, it is plausible that said 
similarities resulted in continued activation of the putamen when participants were 
encoding new information (i.e., at reversal) without negatively impacting behavioral 
performance.  A similar finding was demonstrated by Foerde, Knowlton, and Poldrack 
(2006), in which putamen activation was associated with classification learning during a 
dual task procedure in the absence of habitual behavior.   
Consistent with Hypothesis 1 of Aim 2, neural functioning in regions of the PFC 
and dorsomedial striatum that typically differentiate between gains and losses exhibited 
reduced discriminative sensitivity only in participants exposed to acute stress.  That is, 
BOLD responses associated with positively and negatively valenced stimuli in caudate, 
mPFC, and FPFC failed to reach significance in the acute stress group.  Interestingly, 
discriminability with respect to reward-related information during the learning phase 
tasks was maintained in the putamen even after exposure to acute stress.  This finding is 
significant in that it supports the broad notion that the putamen is important for the 
maintenance of “habits” (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998; Killcross & Coutureau, 2003; Yin 
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et al., 2004).  It is important, however, that this finding be viewed in the context of 
experimental paradigm as the continued putamen discriminability responses after stress 
was only observed during exposure to the overlearned stimuli.  The persistence of 
putamen activation during the learning of post-reversal stimuli in the control group 
supports the notion that regions associated with both the habit and goal-based system can 
be concurrently activated (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).   
Direct support for Hypothesis 2 of Aim 2 was not achieved in the current study.  
Specifically, data failed to support the occurrence of a stress-induced shift from 
prefrontal and dorsal medial striatal to dorsal lateral striatal processing during the reversal 
decision trials.  This was likely due to the fact that feedback was withheld during the 
decision phase (McClure, York, & Montague, 2004).  Previous research suggests that the 
striatum is particularly sensitive in discriminating outcomes (O'Doherty et al., 2004; 
Tricomi, Delgado, & Fiez, 2004) or outcome anticipation (Knutson, Adams, Fong, & 
Hommer, 2001; O'Doherty, Deichmann, Critchley, & Dolan, 2002).  Therefore the lack 
of feedback (i.e., outcomes) likely limited the role of striatal activation during learning.  
While this design choice limited our ability to assess shifts in striatal activation, it 
allowed for exploration of dorsal ACC and bilateral insula which are often implicated in 
higher order processes such as decision-making under uncertainty, and cognitive control 
(Craig, 2009).  In both regions, increased activation for bad decisions was observed in 
both pre- and post-reversal decisions regardless of stress group.  As stated previously, the 
ACC has been implicated in multiple functions involving processing of reward-related 
information such as monitoring or correcting errors on various cognitive tasks (Botvinick 
et al., 2001), as well as during punishment trials (e.g., the loss of a monetary reward; 
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Knutson et al., 2000).  Additionally, consistent with the findings of the current study 
processing of reward-related information has been linked more specifically to dorsal 
ACC (Bush et al., 2002). 
Previous research has demonstrated that the insula is also implicated in decision-
making and is particularly sensitive to the uncertainty of the outcome (Rolls et al., 2008).  
Activation of the anterior portion of the insula has also been observed when individuals 
receive an unfair monetary offer (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003).  
These findings are consistent with the present study, where increased activation of the 
anterior insula was observed when participants chose the least advantageous stimulus 
upon decision.  Specifically, it is possible that participants felt more uncertain about their 
“bad” decisions.  Further, some decision trails were designed such that both options had a 
relatively high probably of resulting in a monetary loss, and it is possible that this led 
participants to feel they were given an unfair option.   
That the ACC and anterior insula continued to display similar differential 
activation to that observed during learning for both the stress and control group supports 
the behavioral finding that both groups acquired the new stimuli values after reversal.  If 
the stress group was not able to sufficiently learn the new values after the reversal and 
insula activation is associated with uncertainty and unfairness (Rolls et al., 2008), it is 
unlikely that their bad decisions would be associated with increased insular activation.  
That is, if the new stimuli values were never learned, participants would be working 
under the assumption that they were making “good” decisions when in reality the 
opposite was true.  Instead, the similar activation patterns between the stress and control 
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group suggest that the post-reversal values were learned at the cortical level, despite the 
tendency to revert to habitual behavior in the stress group. 
Importantly, some differences in neural activation between groups might have 
gone unobserved in the current study simply due to a lack of power.  This is reflected 
behaviorally in that most participants were able to successfully adjust their decision-
making post-reversal, regardless of stress condition.  That is, both groups made more 
good decisions compared to bad decisions overall effectively reducing the number of bad 
decision trials available for imaging analyses.  This may have limited the researcher’s 
ability to observe changes in neural function between the stress and control group during 
the decision trials.   
In any case, these data demonstrate that the important role of striatum and FPFC 
in assessing reward value may not occur in the absence of feedback, even for stimuli with 
over-trained associations.  This leads one to speculate how decisions are made in the 
absence of feedback.  In an effort to address this specific question, Daniel and Pollmann 
(2012) devised a fMRI design aimed at measuring neural function during a four day 
observational learning task in the complete absence of feedback.  On day one, bilateral 
putamen displayed greater activation for right compared to wrong decisions.  On day 
four, however, neural patterns shifted to display greater activation for wrong compared to 
right answers in bilateral insula and mPFC, similar to the current study.  While this 
pattern of activation (i.e., as seen in the bilateral insula) has been observed in the early 
stages of feedback learning (Daniel & Pollmann, 2010; Grinband, Hirsch, & Ferrera, 
2006) it has been suggested that similar activation may only be observed in the absence 
of feedback after sufficient training. While this helps to explain the bilateral insula and 
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dorsal ACC activation in the current study, it does not offer an explanation for the neural 
mechanisms underlying the stress-induced reliance on overlearned behaviors.   
Stress-induced changes in activation patterns emerged in the right EC and left 
DLPFC after adding the factor of stress group to the original good – bad contrast. 
Located in the medial temporal lobe, the EC relays information between the hippocampus 
and the neocortex (Lavenex & Amaral, 2000) and has been implicated in multiple aspects 
of learning and memory (Suzuki & Eichenbaum, 2000). For example, reward related 
information is thought to gain access to the hippocampus via excitatory projections that 
originate in OFC and other reward areas terminating in the EC (Avital, Ram, Maayan, 
Weizman, & Richter-Levin, 2006; Rolls & Xiang, 2005). Further, EC functioning has 
been directly linked to memory recall (Steffenach, Witter, Moser, & Moser, 2005) and 
stress has been shown to negatively impact EC functioning (Avital et al., 2006).  
Additionally, DLPFC has been implicated in both reward detection (Watanabe, Hikosaka, 
Sakagami, & Shirakawa, 2002) as well as episodic memory (Sandrini, Cappa, Rossi, 
Rossini, & Miniussi, 2003). Evidence also suggests that DLPFC, specifically, is 
responsible for maintaining reward-related information over short delays in order to 
guide future behavior (Krawczyk, 2002).  DLPFC has also been implicated in working 
memory (Goldman-Rakic, 1993; Mayer, 1999) task switching (Brass & von Cramon, 
2004; Dias, Robbins, & Roberts, 1996), and decision-making (Robin & Holyoak, 1995).  
In the current study, increased EC activation was associated with bad decisions 
in the control group and decreased activation in the stress group. Given that bad decisions 
increased with decision difficulty, the pattern of activation observed in the control group 
suggests increased activation for difficult decisions. Additionally, DLPFC activation was 
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significantly reduced in the stress group during reversal decisions compared to the control 
group. Given the roles of EC and DLPFC in reward related memory function and 
attentional control, it is likely that stress-induced habitual behaviors arise from stress-
related disruption of the executive control of memory for newly acquired information. 
The role of cortical regions, as opposed to dorsal striatum, may be especially important 
modulators of stress-induced habitual behaviors in the absence of immediate feedback.   
The final aim of this project sought to explore the relationship between executive 
functioning and stress-related reliance on instrumentally conditioned associations.  
Several executive tests measuring various aspects of working memory (e.g., attention, 
working memory, inhibition, processing speed, and cognitive flexibility) were factor 
analyzed into two components, attention/working memory and impulsivity.  While the 
planned regression could not be conducted due to insufficient correlation with the 
proportion of stress-induced habitual decisions, the relationship between the 
attention/working memory composite and proportion of habit decisions trended toward 
significance.  This trend was expected given prior research demonstrating the link 
between goal-directed behaviors and working memory generally (Otto, Gershman, 
Markman, & Daw, 2013) and the extent to which working memory protects against a 
stress induced reliance on habit-based behaviors (Otto, Raio, et al., 2013).  Given the 
strong link between working memory and goal-oriented processes established by prior 
research, the non- significant trend reported here would likely reach significance in a 
repeat study with a larger sample. 
Examination of the raw neuropsychological data for each test of executive 
functioning demonstrated that baseline cognitive flexibility, as assessed by Trails B, 
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positively correlated with habitual decisions.  That is, individuals who demonstrated 
higher baseline cognitive flexibility were better able to appropriately adjust their way of 
responding during the reversal decision task.  One explanation for this finding is that 
individuals with greater cognitive flexibility are better able to acquire novel stimulus-
response associations.  In the current sample, individuals who performed better on trails 
B made better decisions during learning on days two and three compared to those who 
performed worse.   
Alternatively, increased cognitive flexibility may also improve one’s ability to 
utilize goal-directed systems regardless of exposure to acute stress.  For example, within 
the stress group individuals who scored highest on Trails B made significantly more goal-
directed decisions.  At the neural level, participants in the stress group that demonstrated 
greater cognitive flexibility exhibited differential activation between good and bad 
decisions that reach significance in bilateral insula and ACC. The same pattern of 
activation was not reliably observed in the control group.  Cognitive flexibility, when 
specifically assessed with Trails B, has consistently implicated the anterior insula 
(Dosenbach et al., 2007; Mutschler et al., 2009; Nelson et al., 2010) as well as the ACC 
(Carter, Botvinick, & Cohen, 1999).  Further, both of these regions have also been related 
to bioregulatory processes such as nociception (Apkarian, Bushnell, Treede, & Zubieta, 
2005; Büchel et al., 2002) and autonomic arousal (Critchley, Corfield, Chandler, Mathias, 
& Dolan, 2000) (Critchley & Mathias, 2013).  Therefore, it is likely that these regions 
serve an important link between cognitive and behavioral flexibility after exposure to 
acute stress.   
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Limitations 
While the behavioral results presented here offer a provocative demonstration of 
stress-induced reliance on instrumentally conditioned financial associations, 
consideration of several limiting factors are warranted.  First these results should be 
viewed within the context of a relatively small sample size.  While the current sample 
size of N = 28 is sufficient for whole group analyses, the ability to explore individual 
differences within the stress group (n = 14) is limited.  Further, although the decision to 
withhold feedback during decision trials provided an opportunity to dissociate the effects 
of learning from “pure” decision-making, this appears to have stymied our ability to 
assess medial to lateral dorsal striatal shifts in brain functioning.   
Additionally the financial decision task, specifically the reversal phase, may have 
been somewhat easy.  By simply reversing the probabilistic associations with each 
stimulus, learning was readily acquired by both experimental groups.  Increasing the 
complexity of novel learning and decision phases might yield more variability in which 
to find stress differences during the elicitation of a habit-based or goal-directed behavior.  
Finally, the timing of the stress procedure could be improved.  While the goal was to 
assess the potential for habit behaviors 25-30 minutes after exposure to acute stress, 
technical limitations extended the post-stress window for an additional ~28 minutes.  
This led to a cortisol peak during the regular learning and decision trials, rather than 
during the post-reversal trials.   
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Future Directions 
Future investigations should explore the impact of acute stress on the direct role 
of feedback during habitual decision-making.  This can be accomplished by adjusting the 
current behavioral design to include a portion of decision trials that incorporate feedback.  
Given a sufficient number of trials, it would be possible to examine differences in 
habitual decisions made with and without feedback.  Additionally, instrumental-
conditioning designs similar to the one used in this study could be expanded to assess the 
impact of stress on the role of habit formation, rather than just habit expression.  This can 
be achieved by extending the number of learning days and increasing the number of scans 
performed.  Not only would this allow investigators to examine neural changes 
throughout the development of habitual behaviors, the impact of acute, even chronic, 
stress could be examined at various time points throughout habit formation.   
The role of habitual behaviors, especially under stressful conditions, is wrought 
with clinical implications including surgical (Vitek et al., 1998), pharmacological (Corbit, 
Chieng, & Balleine, 2014), psychotherapeutic, (Watkins & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2014) and 
mediation interventions (Witkiewitz et al., 2014).  Experimental paradigms that are able 
to assess stress-induced changes in reward salience that impact overtrained behavior can 
be applied to any clinical population marked my the development of undesirable habits 
such as substance use disorder, eating disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder and more.  
The ability to examine these conditions using experimental paradigms designed to assess 
relative contributions of habit versus goal-oriented behavior will help researchers and 
clinicians gain a more detailed understanding of the underlying mechanisms associated 
with maladaptive behaviors.   
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The specific effects of stress on instrumental learning and decision making also 
has implications for disorders that are by definition triggered by stress, such as post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as well as disorders often related to stress such as 
anxiety and depression.  Each of these conditions can be characterized as a tendency to 
rely on habitual patterns.  In the case of PTSD, there exists habitual pattern of avoidance 
from stimuli associated with the traumatic event (Olff, Langeland, & Gersons, 2005).  
Indeed anxiety and depression can also be characterized as a tendency to rely on habitual 
cognitive processes known as maladaptive automatic thoughts (Beck, 1979) such as 
worry and rumination.  Investigating common pathologies across various disorders has 
the potential to elucidate commonalities in the underlying neural mechanisms and offer 
new insights for possible re-categorization of metal health disorders along 
mechanistically determined criteria in line with current trends in psychiatry (Insel et al., 
2010).   
Finally, the link demonstrating protective effects of executive functioning with 
regards to goal-directed behavior after acute stress (Otto, Raio, et al., 2013) combined 
with connections between executive and autonomic functioning (Jennings, Allen, 
Gianaros, Thayer, & Manuck, 2015; Thayer & Lane, 2000) suggest that therapeutic 
strategies targeting autonomic relegation (Adamson, Kleckner, VanHout, Srinivasan, & 
Abraham, 2003) may be effective for reducing pathological symptoms associated with 
habitual behavior.  Future research should investigate the degree to which such 
autonomic therapy impacts goal-directed and habitual behaviors and underlying neural 
function.   
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